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There are two things that are important in politics. The first is
money and I can't remember what the second one is.'
* Associate, Thompson & Knight L.L.P.; law clerk to the Honorable Sam A.
Lindsay, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Texas, 2000-2001; B.S.
Iowa State University, 1974; J.D. University of Virginia, 2000. I am greatly indebted to the
Honorable Paul L. Friedman, Professor John Shephard Wiley Jr., Erica Hashimoto, and
Deborah Boardman, who kindled my interest in and influenced my thinking about this
subject, although they may disagree with many of the conclusions I reach. For everything
else, as always, special thanks are due to Peggy Gitt.
1. Attributed to Mark Hanna, 1895, quoted in Helen Dewar, For Campaign Reform,
a Historically Uphill Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 1997, at A5.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Campaign financing law receives substantial attention, both
critical and supportive, from academic commentators 2 and the popular
press3 and was a prominent issue in the presidential primaries of 2000 .
Discussions of campaign financing, however, largely concern whether
to add or eliminate various restrictions on how funds can be raised
and the effects of such changes on the political process The focus is
almost entirely on the substantive provisions, rather than how
violations are prosecuted and the associated criminal penalties.
It is in the latter area that a troubling application of the law has
developed. In recent years, there have been several high-profile
prosecutions for violations of the Federal Election Campaign Act
("FECA"),6 involving contributions nominally by one individual but
2. See, e.g., Symposium, The Law and Economics of Elections, 85 VA. L. REV. 1533
(1999); Symposium, Money, Politics, and Equality, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1603 (1999);
Symposium, Law and the Political Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 605 (1998).
3. See, e.g., Editorial, It's Money, Not Speech, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2000, at A18;
George F. Will, A 100 Percent Tax on Speech?, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 11, 1999, at 96; Editorial,
Yes to Campaign Reform, WASH. POST, Sep. 14, 1999, at A28; Sen. Mitch McConnell, Why
That McConnell Fellow Is So Adamant, WASH. POST, Jun. 28, 1999, at A21 (all writing as
political commentators).
4. See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Gore Plan Would End 'Soft Money,' Endow Elections,
WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2000, at Al; Editorial, Campaign Reform Two-Step, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2000, at A16; E.J. Dionne, Jr., A Campaign on Big Issues, WASH. POST, Dec. 21,
1999, at A41; Editorial, Bipartisan Campaigning, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 1999, at A38;
Howard Fineman, Independents' Day, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, at 32.
5. See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, The Issue of Issue Advocacy: An Economic, Political,
and Constitutional Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1761 (1999) (arguing that regulations on issue
advocacy through restrictions on campaign finance are an unconstitutional infringement of
the First Amendment); Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891 (1999) (arguing for
removal of campaign finance restrictions; that immediate publication of campaign
contributions on the Internet would work a more effective control of issue advocacy and
would not infringe on First Amendment rights); Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation
Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50
STAN. L. REV. 837 (1998) (arguing that requiring anonymity in campaign contributions
would make it more difficult for candidates to sell political influence and discourage quid
pro quo corruption); Fred Wertheimer & Susan Weiss Manes, Campaign Finance Reform:
A Key to Restoring the Health of Our Democracy, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1126 (1994) (arguing
for campaign spending limits, restriction of contributions by political action committees,
and additional regulations to close "bundling" and "soft money" loopholes). For examples
of reform proposals introduced in Congress in recent years, see the Shays-Meehan Bill,
H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999) and the McCain-Feingold Bill, S. 25, 105th Cong. (1997). A
full consideration of campaign finance reform proposals is, of course, far beyond the scope
of this article.
6. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994 & Supp. 1998)). Except where evident
from the context, FECA is used to refer to all of the provisions of 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455,
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funded or reimbursed by another individual deemed to be the true
contributor.7 Prosecutions of such "conduit contribution ' cases are
surprising in at least three significant respects.
First, these prosecutions have not been based (at least
technically) on violations of FECA's many substantive provisions,
such as prohibitions of contributions by corporations or foreign
entities, or statutory limitations on contribution amounts.9 Most
citizens would presumably consider violation of these provisions to be
the most serious crimes related to campaign financing. Instead, the
prosecutions essentially rely on violations of the FECA reporting
requirement." In these cases, the government was not required to
prove a violation of any of the substantive provisions." Prosecuting a
technical violation when more serious violations cannot be proved,
although somewhat troubling, is not uncommon in criminal law, 2 but
some FECA cases carry the approach even further. In some cases,
there is no other FECA violation, as the funds are arguably "soft
money" not subject to most of the substantive restrictions of FECA."3
whether originating in FECA itself, earlier attempts at regulation of election campaigns, or
the subsequent amendments to the 1971 act. See infra Part II for an abbreviated history of
campaign financing law.
7. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (use of straw
contributors to funnel money from a tax exempt religious organization into various
political campaigns); United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1038-39 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (source of funds for checks to political committee by lawful permanent resident was
from foreign nationals); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1994) (employer
having his employees write checks to political campaign and then reimbursing them);
United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1990) (disguising corporate
contributions as individual contributions by reimbursing employees).
8. There is another, technical meaning of "conduit contribution" embedded in
FECA and associated regulations, where "an individual gives a contribution to a national
political committee for the committee to pass on to [a specified] candidate." Fed. Election
Comm. v. Nat'l Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1992). These
are also often referred to as "earmarked" contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(8) (1994);
11 C.F.R. § 110.6 (1998). For purposes of this Article, "conduit contribution" excludes
these legal, above-board, and regulated contributions.
9. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a), 441b, 441e (1994); see also supra note 7.
10. See supra note 7. The reporting requirement is contained in 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1994).
11. See supra note 7.
12. The classic example is the conviction of "Scarface Al" Capone, not on
racketeering, murder, or Prohibition charges, but for tax evasion. See, e.g., KENNETH
ALLSOP, THE BOOTLEGGERS: THE STORY OF CHICAGO'S PROHIBITION ERA 300-31
(1961).
13. "Soft money" is any campaign contribution that is "not subject to the
contribution limits or source prohibitions" of FECA, as opposed to regulated "hard
money." Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1323, 1324-25 (1998). The soft money loophole has been described as perhaps "the
most egregious of the current abuses of the law." Editorial, An 'Imperfect Messenger,'
WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2000, at A22. See infra notes 77-94 and accompanying text for a
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Second, the defendants have been not corrupt campaign officials,
but the donors.'4 The prosecution theory in these cases has been that
the donors, by concealing their identity, caused the campaigns to file
false information with the Federal Election Commission ("FEC").5
Indeed, in one instance, the government relied on an even more
remote chain of causation, prosecuting an individual who arranged a
fundraising event but was neither the "conduit donor" nor the true
donor.6  Although FECA reporting requirements were held
constitutional largely because of fears of the potential corruption of
politicians, 7 these cases have not relied on any culpability on the part
of campaign officials. In fact, prosecutors often explicitly conclude
that the campaign officials were unknowing victims, rather than co-
conspirators, in the alleged scheme. 8 As such, the donations have no
relation to the primary harm against which FECA protects, but the
donors are prosecuted anyway.
Finally, although FECA contains a specific prohibition against
making contributions under a false name 9 with associated criminal
misdemeanor penalties,2' many high-profile cases today are
prosecuted as felonies under general criminal statutes.2' Congress
arguably did not intend the use of such harsh penalties, but that has
not stopped very real effects on numerous defendants.
This article analyzes this phenomenon and advances three
independent arguments22 for the elimination or limitation of felony
further discussion of "soft money," associated reporting requirements, and the impact on
prosecutions of conduit contributions.
14. See, e.g., United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999);
United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 1998).
15. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 520-21 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d
at 13.
16. See United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 54 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Alice-in-
Wonderland-like maze of logical leaps and tangled inferences"), rev'd in part, 176 F.3d 517
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
17. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam). As discussed in
greater detail below, the Court advanced other rationales, but prevention of corruption
seems clearly the most significant state interest justifying the reporting requirements.
18. See, e.g., Bill Miller, Hsia Is Convicted of Illegal Donations: Gore Ally Aided '96
Fund-Raising, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2000, at A14 ("According to prosecutors, the various
campaign treasurers had no idea that the money they got through Hsia was coming from
prohibited sources.").
19. 2 U.S.C. § 441f (1994).
20. Id. § 437g(d).
21. These include, as discussed in further detail below, the general prohibitions
against making false statements to government agencies, 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994), and
conspiracies to defraud the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
22. Reported cases have also advanced other defense arguments that are beyond the
scope of this Article, either because they address a question of fact, see, e.g., United States
[Vol. 42:841
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prosecutions for conduit campaign contributions. As background for
these arguments, Part II provides a brief overview of campaign
finance law, the Buckley v. Valeo23 challenge, and the evolution of
prosecutions under FECA. Part III advances the "mens rea
argument": that prosecutions of this conduct under felony statutes
should, at a minimum, require a showing that the defendant was
aware of the prohibition she is charged with violating. The Supreme
Court has not yet resolved this issue in the context of the federal
campaign financing laws, and the courts of appeal have reached
conflicting positions. However, analysis of the Supreme Court's mens
rea jurisprudence strongly suggests that a culpability element should
be implied for these prosecutions. There are strong reasons for not
relying on prosecutorial discretion in determining whether to
prosecute a particular violation as a felony or as a misdemeanor.
Part IV addresses a more ambitious argument against these
felony prosecutions-that, by passage of the specific misdemeanor
provisions for making campaign contributions in the name of another,
Congress in effect has preempted the application to conduit
contributions of the general criminal statutes for false statements, mail
fraud, and conspiracy to defraud. Defendants routinely, and
unsuccessfully, make such arguments. The Supreme Court has not
ruled on this exact issue. Those courts that have dealt with the issue
have generally limited their review to the statutory language and
legislative history and brief citations to precedents without significant
analysis. Although the preemption argument has been consistently
rejected to date, this Part suggests that the courts' reliance on
precedent is misplaced and their analysis of the issue is incomplete. A
more nuanced approach supports a finding of preemption in this area.
As part of the analysis, I introduce a new concept, "greater included
offense," to help explain why preemption is appropriate for
prosecutions of conduit contributions.
Part V introduces the third, and most ambitious, argument-that
criminal felony (and possibly even misdemeanor) prosecutions of
campaign contributions under a false name constitute a serious
infringement of First Amendment rights of political speech and
association. This argument was apparently rejected in Buckley, but a
careful examination of the Court's opinion suggests that the Buckley
v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 55 (D.D.C. 1998) (causation), rev'd in part, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C.
Cir. 1999); United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62-63 (D.D.C. 1998) (causation); or a
question of law that is not generally applicable to all such cases, see Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at
44-47 (First Amendment freedom of religion).
23. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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rationales do not justify infringing on First Amendment rights in the
specific context of conduit contributions. Accordingly, such
prosecutions should be either prohibited or severely limited through
the imposition of additional elements, narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling government interest.
II. OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCING RESTRICTIONS
A. FECA and Buckley v. Valeo
Federal campaign financing restrictions are not a relatively new
phenomenon.24 Predecessors to FECA were enacted in 1907, 1925,
1943, and 1947.2' These laws restricted the parties who could
contribute to election campaigns, limited contributors to aggregate
contributions of $5000, and limited to $3,000,000 the amount that
political committees could receive in contributions and spend each
year.26 Political committees and others making expenditures to
influence elections were also required to file periodic statements of
contributions and expenditures. These provisions, however, were not
effectively enforced.'
In response to the perceived inadequacies of existing laws,
Congress passed FECA in 1972, which actually added relatively little
in the way of substantive provisions to deter corrupt campaign
practices. In fact, in some respects, controls over campaign financing
were loosened. Based on "almost unanimous testimony in opposition
to any limit on political contributions" and concerns about the
enforceability and constitutionality of contribution limits, 9 the $5000
24. The following discussion is only a brief review of legislative activity related to
campaign financing. For more detail, see Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of
Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279
(1991).
25. Act of Jan. 26, 1907, ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864; Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1925,
ch. 368, tit. III, 43 Stat. 1070, 1072; Smith-Connally Act of 1943, ch. 144, 57 Stat. 163; Taft-
Hartley Act of 1947, ch. 120, § 304, 61 Stat. 136, 159.
26. 18 U.S.C. §§ 608-613 (1970).
27. 2 U.S.C. §§ 244-246 (1970).
28. "At the time the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 was adopted, reporting
and disclosure laws had been on the books for well over half a century. However, there was
little or no enforcement of these laws, and little or no disclosure." John Warren McGarry,
Remarks Before Citizens Research Foundation Conference at Georgetown University Law
School (April 2-3, 1981), in HERBERT ALEXANDER & BRIAN HAGGERTY, THE FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT AFTER A DECADE OF POLITICAL REFORM 19 (1981).
29. S. REP. NO. 92-229, at 6 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1826. The
Deputy Attorney General testified "that limits on contributions were unrealistic,
[Vol. 42:841
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limitation on individual political contributions was repealed and
replaced with a limit on expenditures from the personal funds of
candidates and their immediate families.3" The contribution limits,
however, were restored (at $1000, lower than pre-FECA levels) by the
1974 amendments to FECA, which also established the FEC.3'
Despite some concerns about the constitutionality of mandated
disclosure of contributions,32  Title III of FECA established
"comprehensive requirements for detailed disclosures of contributions
and expenditures on behalf of candidates for Federal elective office,"33
replacing the earlier, ineffective reporting requirements.34 FECA also
for the first time, as part of Title III, specifically prohibited
contributions in the name of another.3" This last provision was
specifically discussed in none of the Senate or House of
Representatives committee reports on the bill, but presumably was
intended to facilitate the disclosures mandated by Title III.
What the D.C. Circuit characterized as "by far the most
comprehensive [campaign] reform legislation [ever] passed by
Congress"36 did not last long. A suit was filed almost immediately,
seeking both a declaratory judgment that substantial portions of the
law were unconstitutional and injunctive relief. 7  The 1974
amendments had provided for "fast track" review of challenges to the
unenforceable, and probably unconstitutional as a restraint upon the right of a citizen to
express himself under the First Amendment." Id. Professor Ralph Winter of Yale Law
School came to similar conclusions. See id. at 39, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1859
(Supplemental Views of Messrs. Prouty, Cooper, and Scott).
30. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 201, 86 Stat. 3,
8-10 (1972).
31. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, §§
101(a), 208, 88 Stat. 1262, 1263, 1279-87 (1974) [hereinafter FECA 1974]. The need for
further reform had been demonstrated "because the scramble to raise political funds prior
to [the effective date of FECA], and thus to avoid the disclosure provisions of the law,
resulted in broad and grave dissatisfaction with the Act and led to a demand for new and
more comprehensive controls." S. REP. No. 93-689, at 2 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5587, 5588.
32. See H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 32 (1971) (additional views of Mr. Frenzel) ("[T]he
revelation of contributions as low as $25 may raise a constitutional question relative to
'personal spheres of privacy.' Publication of these minor amounts will undoubtedly
discourage participation in political campaigns by many people.")
33. Id. at 1. The Senate described Title III as "a complete revision of the law
governing public reporting of political finances." S. REP. No. 92-229, at 3 (1971), reprinted
in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1823.
34. See Pub. L. No. 92-225, tit. III, 86 Stat. 3, at 11-19 (1972).
35. See id. § 310, 86 Stat. at 19 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 441f (1994)).
36. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir. 1975), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
37. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 8-9.
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constitutionality of the law: the district court was required to
immediately certify any such questions to the court of appeals; the
decision by the court of appeals was "reviewable by appeal directly to
the Supreme Court;" and the court of appeals and Supreme Court
were both directed to expedite disposition." Thus, fifteen and one-half
months passed from the passage of the 1974 amendments to the
decision in Buckley.
While the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of
substantially all of the law,4" the Supreme Court was less supportive of
Congress's efforts. In a per curiam opinion,4 the Court upheld
FECA's contribution limits, disclosure/recordkeeping requirements,
and public financing scheme (through a tax return "checkoff" system);
the expenditure limits were invalidated, and the Court held that the
FEC, as then constituted, did not comply with the Appointments
Clause of the Constitution.42 Although much of the opinion has little
relevance to the subject of this Article, the Court's analysis of the
contribution and expenditure limits and the disclosure/recordkeeping
38. FECA 1974, supra note 31, § 315 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1994)).
39. The passage of the 1974 amendments occurred on October 15, 1974. Id. Pub. L.
No. 93-334. The Supreme Court decided this opinion on January 30, 1976. See Buckley, 424
U.S. at 1. Thus, approximately 13 months passed from the passage of the 1974 amendments
to the decision in Buckley.
40. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 10.
41. The opinion was issued per curiam not because of any lack of importance, but to
enable a quick response. When the Justices discussed the case in conference, the first
scheduled disbursement of funds under the public financing provisions was less than two
months away. See BOB WOODWARD & ScoTr ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE
THE SUPREME COURT 396 (1979). The opinion was divided between Chief Justice Warren
Burger (preamble and statement of facts) and Justices Potter Stewart (contribution and
expenditure limits), Lewis Powell (disclosure and record keeping requirements), William
Brennan (public financing of campaigns), and William Rehnquist (constitutionality of the
FEC). See id. Five additional opinions were issued in the case, by Burger, Byron White,
Thurgood Marshall, Harry Blackmun, and Rehnquist, each concurring in part and
dissenting in part. At least six of the eight Justices (Justice John Paul Stevens did not
participate) supported every part of the opinion except the holding regarding contribution
limits (which garnered five votes), but the only holding on which all eight Justices
concurred was that the litigation constituted a "case or controversy" under Art. III of the
Constitution. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 5. The final published opinion, including an
appendix of the relevant statutes, ran 294 pages in the U.S. Reports. It might have been
even longer. Justice William Douglas, who had retired in 1975, wrote and attempted to
publish a dissent. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra, at 397-99.
42. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 23-38 (contribution limits), 39-59 (expenditure limits),
60-84 (disclosure requirements), 85-109 (public financing), 109-43 (establishment of
FEC). The basic holdings of Buckley were recently reaffirmed in Nixon v. Shrink Missouri
Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000). The basic principles of Buckley were extended from
campaigns for federal offices to campaigns for state offices, based on the state "interests of
preventing corruption and the appearance of it that flows from munificent campaign
contributions." Id. at 390-95.
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requirements warrants further examination.
The difficulty with many of the FECA provisions, of course, was
that they "operate[d] in an area of the most fundamental First
Amendment activities," encompassing both political association and
political expression. 3  The protection provided by the First
Amendment, however, is not absolute, and thus the provisions could
be "sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important
interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment of associational freedoms."" The Court distinguished
between contribution limits (upheld) and expenditure limits (struck
down) in two respects. 5 First, the two sets of provisions invaded the
protected rights to a different extent-expenditure limits
"represent[ed] substantial rather than merely theoretical restraints,",46
and contribution limits "entail[ed] only a marginal restriction upon"
freedom of speech and association. 7
More importantly, the Court found that the state's interests in
limiting contributions were more compelling than those in limiting
expenditures. 8 Contribution limits were justified by their effect in
preventing corruption, whether real or perceived, associated with
large financial contributions exchanged for political quid pro quos."
The Court concluded that actual corruption undermined "the integrity
of our system of representative democracy"" and that preventing "the
appearance of improper influence 'is also critical .... if confidence in
the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a
disastrous extent."' 5 In its discussion of real or perceived corruption,
43. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-15. Appellants also challenged the contribution limits as
"employ[ing] overbroad dollar limits, and discriminat[ing] against candidates opposing
incumbent officeholders and against minor-party candidates in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." Id. at 24. These aspects of the challenge were significant but are not
relevant to the issue of this Article.
44. Id. at 25.
45. Id. at 18.
46. Id. at 19.
47. Id. at 20. For a contrary view, see Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free
Speech: Love and a Question, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 789, 796 (1998) ("Analytically, there is
no real difference between the First Amendment value of a contribution and an
expenditure.").
48. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29. The Court found that the First Amendment required
invalidation of FECA's limitations on campaign expenditure provisions. Id. at 58.
49. See id. at 25-29. In its analysis, the Court found that "[ilt is unnecessary to look
beyond the Act's primary purpose-to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions-in order to find a constitutionally
sufficient justification for the $1,000 contribution limitation." Id. at 26.
50. Id. at 26-27.
51. Id. at 27 (quoting CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973)).
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the Court referred to "improper influence" and "large
contributions.., given to secure a political quid pro quo,"52 but was
willing to assume that "most large contributors do not seek improper
influence over a candidate's position or an officeholder's action."53
Nevertheless, the government's interest in preventing real and
perceived corruption was sufficient to justify prohibiting contributions
(in excess of $1000), even if most would not have involved
corruption."
The interests advanced in support of the expenditure limits were
"alleviating the corrupting influence of large contributions,"55
"equalizing the financial resources of candidates, '' 16 and "reducing the
allegedly skyrocketing costs of political campaigns."57 The Court
agreed that preventing real or perceived corruption arising from large
contributions was an important government interest but concluded
that it was best addressed by the contribution limits rather than the
expenditure limits. 8 Equalizing candidate resources and reducing
overall campaign costs, on the other hand, were insufficient rationales
for a substantial infringement on First Amendment freedoms. 9
Following the analysis of contribution and expenditure limits, the
Court examined the reporting/disclosure requirements. 6° Here, the
analysis was fairly straightforward. Although "compelled disclosure,
in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief
guaranteed by the First Amendment,"'" the disclosure requirements
met the exacting scrutiny test of NAACP v. Alabama62 because there
were sufficiently important governmental interests.63 The Court
identified three categories of state interests which justified disclosure:
(1) allowing voters to evaluate candidates by identifying "'where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent;" ' 64 (2)
"deter[ring] actual corruption and avoid[ing] the appearance of
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the
52. Id. at 26.
53. Id. at 29.
54. See id. at 30.
55. Id. at 55.
56. Id. at 56.
57. Id. at 57.
58. Id. at 55-56.
59. See id. at 56-57.
60. See id. at 60.
61. Id. at 64.
62. 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (holding that such infringements were subject to exacting
scrutiny).
63. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66.
64. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
850 [Vol. 42:841
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light of publicity;"65 and (3) "gathering the data necessary to detect
violations" of contribution limits."' There was no discussion of
whether each of these interests would be independently sufficient to
justify the disclosure requirements or whether all three were required.
Congress's reaction to Buckley was swift. Just over three months
after the opinion was announced, Congress passed the Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976.67 For the subject of this
Article, the most significant change in the 1976 amendments was the
establishment of a two-track enforcement mechanism where knowing
and willful violations were subject to the normal criminal sanctions,'
while minor violations were subject to civil enforcement by the FEC.69
Neither Buckley nor FECA explicitly established the hard
money/soft money dichotomy for campaign contributions. Indeed, the
only relevant comment in Buckley (although dictum) suggests that the
Court assumed there is no soft money loophole. After construing the
definition of "independent expenditures" narrowly for purposes of
expenditure limits, the Court pointed out that
[u]nlike the contribution limitations' total ban on the giving of
large amounts of money to candidates, § 608(e)(1) prevents only
some large expenditures. So long as persons and groups eschew
expenditures that in express terms advocate the election or
defeat of a clearly identified candidate, they are free to spend as
much as they want to promote the candidate and his views."
The hard-soft distinction was apparently created by the FEC in
1978, in a letter to the Kansas Republican State Committee that
allowed it to use funds from sources prohibited by FECA for
"administrative expenses and get-out-the-vote .. .drives that would
benefit both state and federal candidates."'" Subsequent regulations
required expenditures directly attributable to a specific campaign to
be paid for with hard money.72 Administrative expenses and other
expenditures, such as issue ads, that do not contain explicit
65. Id. at 67.
66. Id. at 67-68 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
67. FECA Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. at 475 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 437 (1994)).
68. Id. § 112.
69. Id. § 109.
70. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45 (emphasis added).
71. Note, Soft Money: The Current Rules and the Case for Reform, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1323, 1325 (1998).
72. See id. at 1327 (stating that 11 C.F.R. § 106.5(a) requires that money spent in
connection with a federal candidate must be in hard dollars).
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electioneering messages could be paid for partly with soft money.73
This is consistent with FECA's definition of "contribution," which is
limited to "money or other valuable assets 'for the purpose of...
influencing' the nomination or election of candidates for federal
office."74
The district court in United States v. Kanchanalak concluded that
the statutory reporting requirement itself applied only to hard money
contributions.75 As the court had earlier noted in United States v. Trie,
however, a soft money conduit donation can still provide the basis for
prosecution even if there are otherwise no restrictions on such
donations.76 "While FECA itself proscribes only conduct that relates
to 'hard money' contributions, FEC regulations require political
committees to report both hard money contributions and soft money
donations. 7 7 The FEC is granted power to "prescribe rules,
regulations and forms to carry out the provisions of this Act,, 78 and
such a grant of power is generally acknowledged as sufficient to
authorize a regulation that is "reasonably related to the purposes of
the enabling legislation., 79 Gathering information concerning soft
73. See id. at 1326-28.
74. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 431(e), (f) (1976)). The actual scope
of FECA's source prohibitions and contribution limits is not entirely clear. In United States
v. Trie, the court concluded that the prohibition of contributions by foreign nationals
applied only to hard money contributions, not soft money donations. See United States v.
Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55, 58 (D.D.C. 1998). The D.C. Circuit subsequently disagreed in
United States v. Kanchanalak, holding that contributions by foreign nationals were also
prohibited for use in state and local campaigns. See United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d
1037, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This left open the possibility that such monies could be used
for other "soft money" activities such as issue advertising. For a cynical evaluation of the
hard-soft distinction, see George F. Will, A Soft-Money Sob Story, WASH. POST, Nov. 29,
2001, at A33.
Unlike hard money, which is given to a particular candidate's campaign, soft
money is given to parties for issue advertising and other 'party-building'
activities, and cannot be used to 'influence' any federal election. These
distinctions are absurd and, like Prohibition, produce cynicism about the law.
Trying to draw a bright line between hard and soft money is like trying to draw a
line in a river. What is the point of issue advertising if not to influence elections?
Id.
75. See United States v. Kanchanalak, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on
other grounds, 192 F.3d 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1999) The government had also conceded in Trie
that "the statutory prohibition of making contributions in the name of another under 2
U.S.C. § 441(f) applies only to hard money contributions." Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 59.
76. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 59 n.4 (citing 11 C.F.R. § 104.8(a), (e) (1998)).
77. Id. (emphasis added).
78. 2 U.S.C. § 438(a)(8) (1994) (emphasis added).
79. See Mourning v. Family Publ'ns Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (detailing the
Court's acceptance of the Federal Reserve Board's interpretation of the Truth in Lending
Act as "reasonably related").
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money receipts by national political committees, while not specifically
mandated by FECA, bears a reasonable relation to the FEC's stated
goal of "eliminat[ing] the perception that prohibited funds have been
used to benefit federal candidates and elections."'
This creates an anomaly. If an individual donates soft money
funds to a political campaign committee, the contribution cannot
violate most of FECA's substantive provisions, including that
provision against making a contribution in the name of another.
Individuals providing the funds are not required by FECA to identify
their names for soft money donations or hard money contributions."
Nevertheless, if the donor of soft money provided a false name to the
campaign committee, the committee treasurer would report that false
name to the FEC and subject the donor to felony prosecution under
the false statements and general conspiracy statutes,2 but the donor
could not be prosecuted under the FECA misdemeanor provisions.83
This is not merely a potential. In Kanchanalak and Trie, the courts
upheld counts in indictments that may have involved only soft
money.'
B. The Evolution of Prosecutorial Approach
As noted above, FECA includes two distinct enforcement
mechanisms-administrative conciliation and civil enforcement by the
FEC85 and criminal enforcement by the Department of Justice
("DOJ"). 86 From all indications, for several years the DOJ was
satisfied with the enforcement sanctions offered by FECA. For
example, in 1984 the Public Integrity Section of the DOJ issued the
fourth edition of their manual on prosecution of election offenses (the
80. Methods of Allocation Between Federal and Non-Federal Accounts; Payments;
Reporting, 55 Fed. Reg. 26,058, 26,059 (June 26, 1990) (codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 104.8).
81. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C.
Cir. 1996).
82. United States v. Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d 1037, 1044-45 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (donor
who gave false name would "be held responsible for causing the false statement").
83. CRAIG C. DONSANTO, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION
OF ELECTION OFFENSES 78 (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed.].
84. See Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d at 1039, 1050; United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55,
58 (D.D.C. 1998). These soft money donations may have involved foreign source funds,
which are prohibited by FECA. See Kanchanalak, 192 F.3d at 1047-50. However, that was
not critical to permitting indictments based on soft money donations. See id. at 1050.
85. CRAIG C. DONSANTO, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION
OF ELECTION OFFENSES 53-54 (4th ed. 1984) (emphasis added) [hereinafter D.O.J.
MANUAL, 4th ed.] (stating that non-criminal penalties are imposed by the FEC, while the
DOJ prosecutes campaign finance crimes).
86. Id.
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"Manual" or "DOJ Manual") 7 In it, the department's official policy
was described as follows:
It is the policy of the Criminal Division to prosecute campaign
financing crimes under the FECA's penal sanctions only in cases
where the offense was either committed secretly and involved a
substantial sum of money, or where it was part of a larger and
more aggravated crime. All other campaign finance matters are
routinely referred to the Federal Election Commission for the
imposition of appropriate noncriminal penalties pursuant to the
Act's civil enforcement mechanisms. 88
There was no hint of using other criminal statutes to stop campaign
financing abuses.
Three and one-half years later, the DOJ adopted a much more
aggressive stance. Now, it had determined that "[t]he criminal penalty
provided in 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) has many features that render it
difficult to use in federal criminal prosecutions."89 These features
include a limitation to misdemeanor sanctions, a short statute of
limitations, "complex and confusing venue rules," and a monetary
jurisdictional floor.' In place of the FECA provisions, the DOJ
developed "alternative prosecutive theories" under which a violation
of FECA could be prosecuted under the federal false statements
statute or as a "conspiracy to defraud the United States."91 The
primary example that it gave was of conduit contributions.92
The new department policy93 essentially abandoned the FECA
87. Id.
88. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
89. D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed., supra note 83, at 75.
90. Id. To be a criminal violation of FECA, the amount of funds involved must total
$2000. Id. at 74.
91. Id. at 75-76. The current federal false statements statute is 18 U.S.C. § 1001
(1994); conspiracy to defraud the United States is covered under 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
Both are felonies, subject to penalties of five years. In the case of conduit campaign
contributions, the defendants normally do not directly violate the false statements statute.
The current DOJ Manual provides that "[ijn most cases the [campaign committee]
treasurer [responsible for reporting contributions] is not a participant in the illegal scheme.
Hence these defendants are charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2(b), as 'willfully causing' the false
FEC report." CRAIG C. DONSANTO & NANCY S. STEWART, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OFFENSES 110 n.40 (6th ed. 1995)
[hereinafter D.O.J. MANUAL, 6th ed.].
92. See D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed., supra note 83, at 76.
93. This change in policy is corroborated by comparing articles, written seven years
apart, by a former Associate General Counsel in charge of enforcement at the FEC.
Compare Kenneth A. Gross & Ki P. Hong, The Criminal and Civil Enforcement of
Campaign Finance Laws, 10 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 51, 55 (1998) ("[P]rosecutors can also
bring felony charges for FECA violations under other criminal statutes, such as fraud, false
statements, and conspiracy."), with Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforcement of Campaign
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criminal sanctions. The DOJ considered "that most FECA violations
are appropriately enforced through the imposition of noncriminal
sanctions imposed administratively by the FEC,"'9 and would only
consider criminal prosecution if the violation involved large sums of
money if "clandestine means or subterfuge were used to disguise the
unlawful character of the underlying offense"95 and if inaccurate
reports were filed with the FEC.96 Any such criminal prosecutions
should, if possible, be brought under general felony statutes rather
than the FECA penal provisions:,
Where such aggravating factors are present, efforts should be
made to posture the case as a felony under one or more of the
alternative "fraud" theories of prosecution summarized above.
Disposition under the FECA's own criminal penalty provision
(2 U.S.C. 437g(d)), which provides for misdemeanor penalties, is
generally less attractive, and tacticaly more difficult, than
presenting the matter as a "fraud" case."
Apparently, DOJ's justification for this policy was primarily a matter
of prosecutorial convenience. Only one argument was advanced that
went to the underlying merits of the higher punishment: "[FECA]
purports to reach only malum in se activity, and yet it provides for
only misdemeanor sanctions."98
The DOJ also clearly suggested that criminal prosecution of these
contributions depended on a substantive violation of FECA separate
from the incorrect reporting itself. For example, criminal violations
requiring "knowing and willful" intent would be those situations
where "surreptitious means (such as cash, conduits, or false
documentation) are employed to conceal conduct that itself violates
one or more of the FECA's substantive requirements,"" or "a
substantive FECA violation takes place as a means to a felonious
end.' "' The alternative prosecutive theories worked in part because
"most criminally prosecutable FECA offenses involve some effort...
Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 279, 294-300
(1991) (discussing the availability of other criminal statutes, but omitting the false
statements statute, and implying that conspiracy to defraud the United States would be
limited to specific quid pro quo arrangements rather than merely impeding the FEC's
ability to identify the true source of contributed funds).
94. D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed., supra note 83, at 78.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 75.
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 74.
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to conceal the illegal character of the financial activity in question.'. 1
The concealment itself was identified not as a sufficient basis for
criminal prosecutions, but as proof that "a defendant was actively
aware he was violating one of FECA's regulatory prohibitions or
duties.""1 2
This last point had also been advanced in the previous edition of
the Manual, under which criminal prosecutions were still limited to
the FECA misdemeanor sanctions. The fourth edition of the DOJ
Manual acknowledged that "willfulness" required "proof that the
offender had an active awareness that he was doing something wrong
when he committed the transgression in question,"1 3 such as
"evidence that the offender sought to cover up his conduct."',,, Thus,
concealment was proof of willfulness rather than the underlying
offense."'
The DOJ has subsequently backed off somewhat from this
attitude that nearly all criminal prosecutions should be brought under
the general felony statutes. The latest Manual still identifies felony
prosecutions as applicable to violations of "one or more of the
FECA's core campaign financing prohibitions"'06 or the use of
"conduits or other means calculated to conceal the illegal source of the
contribution.""1 7 In addition, it established guidelines as to choosing
between felony or FECA misdemeanor prosecutions: felony charges
should be brought where the illegal activity involved totaled over
$10,000 or where "special circumstances" would warrant felony
charges. 8 The dollar cut-off is, of course, not mentioned in the
statutory scheme, and the "special circumstances" are not defined in
the Manual."9
101. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 74.
103. D.O.J. MANUAL, 4th ed., supra note 85, at 53-54 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 54.
105. Id.
106. D.O.J. MANUAL, 6th ed., supra note 91, at 108 (emphasis added).
107. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 115.
109. Cf. Gross & Hong, supra note 93, at 53-55. Gross & Hong describe the
aggravating factors used to justify criminal enforcement versus civil enforcement, but note
that no such factors are used to distinguish between felony prosecution under general
criminal statutes and misdemeanor prosecution under FECA. Id. The only reasons that the
authors provide for felony prosecutions are that "prosecutors [may] have difficulties
bringing a criminal charge under FECA," that "prosecutors generally prefer felony statutes
with jail time," and that "the threat of a felony can be effective leverage in reaching a plea
agreement on a misdemeanor." Id. at 55.
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III. THE MENS REA ARGUMENT
One of the key issues to arise in litigation of these conduit
contribution cases is the appropriate mens rea standard."° Felony
prosecutions under the false statements statute, in conjunction with
the aiding and abetting statute, are subject to a "willfully" element in
both statutes." "Knowingly and willfully" in criminal law generally
does not imply anything beyond the fact that the defendant was aware
of her actions and took them deliberately."'2 In some federal criminal
cases, however, the Supreme Court has interpreted "knowingly"
and/or "willfully" to require that the defendant knew of the law she
was violating, or at least was aware that her actions were unlawful."3
In the context of felony prosecutions of conduit contributions
under the false statements and aiding and abetting statutes, the
interpretation of "knowingly and willfully" is currently unsettled. The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has applied a higher
standard-knowledge of the law being violated"'-while the Courts of
Appeals for the Second and D.C. Circuits have applied the traditional
standard, requiring only knowledge of the information that makes the
statements false."5 The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the
circuit split.
The appropriate mens rea standard, however, is relatively clear in
the case of misdemeanor FECA prosecutions of conduit contributions.
In that situation, there is clear indication in the legislative history of
110. For simplicity, the following discussion focuses on prosecution under the false
statements statute, but similar argument would apply, for example, to prosecutions for
conspiracy to defraud the United States.
111. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (Supp. 1997) ("[W]hoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any materially false, fictitious, or
fraudulent statement or representation.., shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.") (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994) ("Whoever
willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed by him or another would be
an offense against the United States, is punishable as a principal.") (emphasis added).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The
Government may prove that a false representation is made 'knowingly and willfully' by
proof that the defendant acted deliberately and with knowledge that the representation
was false.").
113. See United States v. Bryan, 524 U.S. 184 (1998); Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S.
135 (1994); Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
114. United States v. Curran, 20 F.2d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he federal election
law context requires the prosecution to prove that the defendant had knowledge of the
treasurers' reporting obligations .... ).
115. See United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 101 (2d Cir. 1997) (knowledge that acts
violated the law not required); see also United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
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congressional intent for the higher standard, knowledge of the law
being violated."6 As the court noted in United States v. Trie:
In establishing the civil and criminal liability penalty scheme for
FECA, Congress expressly stated that the "knowing and willful"
requirement was intended to limit liability to cases in which "the
acts were committed with a knowledge of all the relevant facts
and a recognition that the action is prohibited by law."
Where FECA provides the underlying statutory scheme for a
felony prosecution under the generally applicable false
statements statute, it is at least as important to require the
government to prove that the defendant knew of the statutory
and regulatory requirements at issue as Congress concluded it
was for a misdemeanor conviction under FECA itself.
17
The legislative history cited was actually referring to the most severe
level of civil penalties, but both civil penalties and criminal penalties
use virtually identical mens rea language. "8
Section A of this part addresses, in abbreviated form, the
Supreme Court's recent jurisprudence regarding the application of
mens rea standards in criminal law."9 A full examination is well
beyond the scope of this Article,2 ' but a brief review is important for
the evaluation of circuit court cases relating to conduit contributions.
Section B reviews those circuit court cases in detail, while Section C
analyzes them against the standards developed by the Supreme
Court.' In doing so, I conclude that the position of the Third Circuit,
requiring proof that the defendant knew of the reporting
requirement,'22 is the appropriate application of Supreme Court
precedent.
116. See H.R. REP. No. 94-917, at 3-4 (1976).
117. United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1998) (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 94-917, at 4 (1976)) (internal citation omitted).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 94-917, at 3-4 (1976). Compare 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(6)(C)
(1994) ("knowing and willful violation," provision for civil penalties), with 2 U.S.C. §
437g(d)(1)(A) (1994) ("who knowingly and willfully commits a violation," provision for
criminal penalties).
119. See discussion infra Section II-A.
120. Those interested in a more in-depth discussion can refer to John Shepard Wiley
Jr., Not Guilty by Reason of Blamelessness: Culpability in Federal Criminal Interpretation,
85 VA. L. REV. 1021 (1999). For another review of the issue, arguing against the trend, see
Sharon L. Davies, The Jurisprudence of Willfulness: An Evolving Theory of Excusable
Ignorance, 48 DUKE L.J. 341 (1998).
121. See discussion infra, Sections II-B and -C.
122. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that
willfulness requires knowledge of the wrongful act).
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A. The Supreme Court's Mens Rea Jurisprudence
The general standard that "ignorance of the law excuses no
one"'23 has encountered various exceptions, such as Lambert v.
California, 4 but is still the default rule.2 ' In most cases, this raises no
significant concern because the behavior in question is morally
culpable whether the defendant knew of the specific legal prohibition
or not, because of community consensus that the conduct is
immoral.'26 A problem arises when the defendant violates a law which
"embodies no moral norm" and about which the defendant did not
know. "'27 That problem has arguably gotten worse in recent years,
especially since 1986, as "Congress has passed a host of new criminal
prohibitions" which "carry heavy penalties and the potential for
outlawing apparently innocent behavior..'.. "Ignorance of the law is
no excuse" no longer works as well as it once did.29
In response to this problem, the Supreme Court has in recent
years apparently developed a new approach to statutory construction
of criminal statutes that is "subtle in form but sweeping in
implication."'30 If a morally blameless person could hypothetically
violate the statute, the Court formulates an additional mens rea
element sufficient to prevent conviction of those who are not
culpable.3 ' As yet, the new rule has not been clearly stated by the
Court,'32 and as will be seen in following sections, some observers
(including some courts of appeal) have not fully understood the
change that the Supreme Court has set in motion. Nevertheless, the
new approach is evident from examination of three recent Supreme
Court cases: Liparota v. United States,3 3 Ratzlaf v. United States, 34 and
123. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 13.01[A], at 147 (2d
ed., 1995).
124. 355 U.S. 225, 229-30 (1958) (holding that a defendant "wholly passive and
unaware of any wrongdoing" cannot be convicted of violating a registration law in comport
with due process).
125. Id. at 228. ("The rule that 'ignorance of the law will not excuse' is deep in our
law.").
126. See Wiley, supra note 120, at 1027-28.
127. Id. at 1028.
128. Id. at 1061-62.
129. Id. at 1023.
130. Id.
131. See id.
132. See id. at 1162 ("The rule of mandatory culpability now is visible, yet inchoate. It
is something the Supreme Court does but has not named.").
133. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
134. 510 U.S. 135 (1994).
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Bryan v. United States.135
Liparota, the first of the three cases, involved an indictment for
buying federal food stamps at discounted prices. "6 The law in question
prohibited the knowing but unauthorized transfer, acquisition,
alteration, or possession of food stamp coupons.'37 The Court
concluded that the statute must be interpreted to apply only when a
defendant knew that his conduct was unauthorized or illegal.'38 The
Court reached this conclusion largely by considering a range of
"inventive and far-fetched" possible situations in which the
hypothetical defendant would not be morally culpable-using stamps
in a store which illegally charged higher prices to food stamp
recipients than to other customers, or tearing up and throwing away
food stamps received in error.'39 This demonstrated that the statute, if
not narrowly construed to require knowledge of the law, would reach
a "broad range of apparently innocent conduct."'"" The Court's
interpretation was necessary to avoid abuse by prosecutors.''
The most prominent application of the rule was enunciated nine
years later."' In Ratzlaf the defendant was charged with "structuring"
cash transactions.' To fight money laundering, federal law required
financial institutions to report all cash transactions greater than
$10,000;'" because of the potential for evasion of the reporting
requirement, Congress later added a prohibition against structuring
cash transactions, that is, breaking one large transaction into several
smaller transactions, each less than $10,000, "for the purpose of
135. 524 U.S. 184 (1998).
136. See Liparota, 471 U.S. at 421.
137. See id. at 420 n.1.
138. Id. at 425.
139. Wiley, supra note 120, at 1039; see also Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426-27.
140. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426. Whether the "inventive and far-fetched" examples
cited actually demonstrated a broad range of apparently innocent conduct is arguable.
Justice Byron White was not concerned by the breadth of real behavior that the statute
would reach. Id. at 437 n.3 (White, J., dissenting) ("We should proceed on the assumption
that Congress had in mind the run-of-the-mill situation, not its most bizarre mutation.").
As the next case in this line demonstrated, however, the range of apparently innocent
conduct subject to prosecution need not necessarily be "broad" to implicate concerns
about culpability.
141. Id. at 427.
142. Ratzlaf was a central focus in the analysis by the circuit courts which have
addressed the mens rea issue in the context of federal election law and/or prosecutions
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 1001, with little or no attention given to the other cases reviewed
in this section. See infra Section III-B.
143. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994).
144. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b) (1994).
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evading the reporting requirements."'4 5 Another provision established
stiff penalties for "willfully violating" provisions of the subchapter,
including the anti-structuring provision. The issue was not
knowledge of the reporting requirements, which the defendant
admitted; the issue was whether the government had to show
knowledge of the anti-structuring provision.'47
The Court noted some traditional statutory construction
arguments supporting its interpretation of the mens rea
requirement.' If the analysis had ended there, the opinion would
have been unexceptional. The Court continued on, however, in
response to the government's claim that violators of the anti-
structuring provision "by their very conduct, exhibit a purpose to do
wrong, which suffices to show 'willfulness.""49 This shifted the battle
onto the Liparota battleground-was the prohibited conduct itself,
without anything more, sufficient to demonstrate moral culpability?5 °
The Court presented another hypothetical "parade of horribles"-
individuals who structured cash transactions "to reduce the risk of an
IRS audit," "to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth," or due
to fear "that the bank's reports would increase the likelihood of
burglary"-and concluded that "currency structuring is not inevitably
nefarious."'"' Arguably, it was this final part of the analysis that was
primarily responsible for the Court's conclusion: "In light of these
examples, we are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so
obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is
satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of
structuring."12
Significantly, the Court still relied on a hypothetical "parade of
horribles" that bore little resemblance to the actual defendant.'53 In
addition, the Court moved toward a more expansive definition of the
problem than the rule was designed to address. Instead of Liparota's
concern about statutes that penalized a "broad range of apparently
145. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 138-40 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 5324).
146. Id. at 140 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5322).
147. See id. at 137-38.
148. See id. at 140-43.
149. Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
150. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 423 (1985) (explaining that the
controversy concerned whether the mental state of the defendant, if any, must be proven
by the government).
151. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144-45 (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
153. See id. at 155 & n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's
application of the restructuring law).
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innocent conduct,"'. 54 the Ratzlaf Court would apply its rule to any
statute that criminalized conduct that was not "inevitably" nefarious
or "invariably" blameworthy.' If the Court could conceive of any
(hypothetical) blameless defendant who might violate the terms of the
statute, it would require that the government prove knowledge of the
criminal prohibition.156
The Court cited its earlier decision in Cheek v. United States, 57 a
tax evasion case, for "the venerable principle that ignorance of the law
generally is no defense to a criminal charge."'58 That seems odd
because Cheek was an exception to the "venerable principle."'5 9 In
Cheek, the Court noted that "almost 60 years ago [we] interpreted the
statutory term 'willfully' as used in the federal criminal tax statutes as
carving out an exception to the traditional rule. This special treatment
of criminal tax offenses is largely due to the complexity of the tax
laws."' 6 The Ratzlaf Court reached the same result without relying on
any conclusion as to-indeed, without discussing-the complexity of
the anti-structuring provisions.'6' The dissent, in fact, pointed out that
"the provisions involved are perhaps among the simplest in the
United States Code" and, for that reason, concluded that the Cheek
rule was inapplicable.' The rule in Ratzlaf was thus a general rule,
based on whether innocent people could violate the statute regardless
of the relative simplicity or complexity of the law.'63
The latest Supreme Court pronouncement on this issue arose in
Bryan, which concerned a prosecution for dealing in firearms without
the required federal license.16' That offense required the defendant to
have acted "willfully.' ' 65 On appeal, the defendant argued that
"knowledge of the federal licensing requirement.., was an essential
154. Liparota, 471 U.S. at 426.
155. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144-45 (emphasis added).
156. See id. at 146.
157. 498 U.S. 192 (1991).
158. Ratz1af, 510 U.S. at 149 (quoting Cheek, 498 U.S. at 199).
159. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200.
160. Id.
161. See Davies, supra note 120, at 375 (noting that Ratzlaf would have lost under
earlier formulations of the rule, which were initially limited to tax statutes and then had
been extended to "complex" statutes, since "the anti-structuring statute was not
complex").
162. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 156 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
163. See id. (referring to the structuring statute as the "simplest in the United States
Code").
164. See Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 186 (1998).
165. See id. at 188-89. For the relevant statutory provisions, see id. at 187 n.2 (quoting
18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) (1994)), at 188 n.6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1) (1994)).
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element of the offense."'" The Supreme Court agreed that
in the criminal law [willfully] also typically refers to a culpable
state of mind .... As a general matter, when used in the
criminal context, a "willful" act is one undertaken with a "bad
purpose." In other words, in order to establish a "willful"
violation of a statute, "the Government must prove that the
defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was
unlawful.
, 167
This statement affirmatively answered the Court's question of
whether some degree of minimum culpability was necessary for a
169conviction under this "willfully" provision."6 The answer was yes.
The remaining discussion addressed not whether the government
needed to prove culpability, but rather exactly how much culpability
had to be shown. 7°
When it moved on to that question, the Court brushed aside the





"Willfully" did indeed imply a higher burden than the "knowingly"
standard that the statute used for some prohibitions. 72 Since the latter
required only "knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense," the
Court could interpret the "willfully" standard as imposing a higher
level of culpability, but still less than knowledge of the specific law.73
Further, the previous decisions in Ratzlaf and Cheek, interpreting
"willfully" to require knowledge of the specific statutory provisions,'74
were distinguishable because they involved "highly technical statutes
that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in
apparently innocent conduct."'75 The Court further noted that "there
was a need for specificity" in such technical statutes "that is
inapplicable when there is no danger of conviction of a defendant with
166. Id. at 190.
167. Id. at 191-92 (footnote omitted) (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 137).
168. See id. at 191 n.12 (noting that willful may be described as acting with a bad
purpose, without ground for believing the act is lawful, or with careless disregard as to
whether the act is lawful).
169. See id. at 196.
170. See id. at 192. See also Davies, supra note 120, at 382 n.166 (noting that the
government did not even attempt to "argue that the willfulness genie be put back in the tax
bottle").
171. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 192.
172. See id. (explaining that the defendant's argument "is not persuasive because the
term 'knowingly' does not necessarily have any reference to a culpable state of mind or to
knowledge of the law").
173. Id. at 193.
174. Ratzlaf v. United States 510 U.S. 135, 136-37 (1994); Cheek v. United States, 498
U.S. 193, 200 (1991).
175. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 194.
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an innocent state of mind."'76 There was no such danger here, as "the
jury found that this petitioner knew that his conduct was unlawful."'77
The evidence of such knowledge-using straw purchasers, promising
to file off serial numbers, and reselling the guns in areas where drugs
were sold-was "unquestionably adequate. ' 78
The decision in Bryan was remarkable. It seemed to imply that
"willfully" always required a showing that a defendant knew his
conduct was "unlawful."'79 There was still the question of whether
knowledge of the specific statutory provision need be shown, but the
government would always have to show some minimum degree of
culpability. "[T]he traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no
excuse," however, still stood.'" This interpretation, unlike Ratzlaf and
Cheek, was not an exception to that rule because this interpretation
required knowledge of unlawfulness but not of the specific law.'"' Both
sides lost in Bryan-its culpability rule set a lower threshold than had
Liparota, Ratzlaf, and Cheek but would cover a wider range of
statutes.' 82 Apparently, the higher threshold (requiring a showing that
the defendant had knowledge of the specific law being violated) still
applies to "highly technical" statutes with either "complex (Cheek) or
relatively unknown (Ratzlaj) provisions. 1 83
Based on an examination of these Supreme Court cases, there is
indeed a new rule in criminal jurisprudence. Generally, "willfully" will
be interpreted to require a showing of some degree of culpability-at
least, the defendant's general knowledge that what he was doing was
unlawful. Under some circumstances, such as complex statutes or
relatively unknown prohibitions that could criminalize a broad range
of "apparently innocent conduct," that culpability requirement may
extend to a showing that the defendant was aware of the specific legal
duty he or she is charged with violating.
176. Id. at 195 n.22 (emphasis added).
177. Id. at 195.
178. Id. at 189.
179. This is strikingly different than the view codified in the Model Penal Code, under
which "willfully" does not require knowledge of the law being violated. See MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(9) (1985).
180. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 196.
181. Id. The dissent criticized this lack of specificity, interpreting the Court's opinion
to allow conviction for unlicensed dealing in firearms if the defendant merely knew that he
was violating some law, even one totally unrelated to the conduct in question. See id. at
201-03 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
182. See Davies, supra note 120, at 383-87.
183. Id. at 384.
184. Id. at 386 & n.182.
[Vol. 42:841
2001] PROSECUTING CONDUIT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 865
B. The Current Circuit Split
The Third Circuit was the first to address the mens rea issue in
the context of federal election law in United States v. Curran.' That
case involved a typical conduit contribution scheme.'86 The Court
found that "knowing and willful" in the false statements statute
required only proof that "a defendant 'acted deliberately and with
knowledge that the representation was false.""' "[T]he government
used section 2(b) in conjunction with section 1001," because the
conduct in question "did not fall directly within the scope of section
1001."'" Therefore, it was necessary to determine the "proper
construction of 'willfulness' required for a charge under section 2(b)
linked with section 1001 in an Election Campaign Act case." 8 9 In this
respect, the court turned to the interpretation of "willfully" in
Ratzlaf.'9
The Curran court noted that "the defendant in Ratzlaf was not
charged with violations of sections 2(b) and 1001," but, nonetheless,
found "nothing in the Court's discussion of willfulness that would
confine the rationale to the currency reporting statute."' 9' In this
respect, the court drew a sharp contrast between Cheek, which had
been limited to violations of complex provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code, and Ratzlaf.1' Three similarities between Curran and
Ratzlaf persuaded the court to apply the Ratzlaf standard: 1) the
underlying statutes (currency reporting and FECA reporting
obligations) were similar in that prosecution was based in part on a
third party's obligation to provide information to the government; 2)
the defendants' conduct was not "obviously 'evil' or inherently 'bad"';
and 3) the underlying statutes were regulatory schemes, malum
prohibitum rather than malum in se.'93 With regard to the second
similarity, arguably the primary driver behind Ratzlaf, the court in
Curran noted that "[w]e see little difference between breaking a cash
transaction into segments of less than $10,000 and making a
contribution in the name of another."'94 Consequently, the court
185. 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
186. Id. at 566.
187. Id. at 567 (quoting United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990)).
188. Id.
189. Id. at 568.
190. See id. (citing Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141 (1994)).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 568-69.
193. See id. at 569.
194. Id.
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concluded that "willfulness in cases brought under sections 2(b) and
1001 in the federal election law context requires the prosecution to
prove that defendant knew of the treasurers' reporting obligations, that
he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his
conduct was unlawful.,
195
The Second Circuit disagreed in United States v. Gabriel.'96 That
case actually arose outside the campaign financing context but again
involved prosecution under sections 2(b) and 1001. 97 The defendants
were executives of Chromalloy Research and Technology ("CRT"), a
division of Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corporation; CRT allegedly
"misrepresent[ed] the nature of some of its jet engine repairs." '198 The
government charged the defendants with causing other employees of
CRT to make false statements on company documents relating to
repairs for Air India and Qantas Airlines because the documents,
maintained in CRT's files, were subject to Federal Aviation
Administration ("FAA") inspection and thus constituted false
statements to a federal agency.'99 The court's analysis, in concluding
that the prosecution need not show that the defendant was aware of
the law she violated, first rejected the Curran approach and then
concluded that the factors on which the Supreme Court based the
Ratzlaf decision did not apply to prosecutions under sections 2(b) and
1001.200
The primary problem that the Gabriel court had with Curran was
its indeterminate, contextual approach. 1 That is, "willfully" in a
prosecution under sections 2(b) and 1001 might or might not
"require[] a knowing violation of the law [depending] on the context
in which the statement was made., 212 The court thought that such a
contextual approach not only would create "obvious interpretative
difficulties," but also was directly foreclosed by Ratzlaf.2 3 Specifically,
Ratzlaf stated that "[a] term appearing in several places in a statutory
text is generally read the same way each time it appears. We have
even stronger cause to construe a single formulation... the same way
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. 125 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1997).
197. Id. at 99 (noting defendant was convicted of making a false statement to the
FAA).
198. Id. at 92.
199. Id. at 92-93.
200. See id. at 101-02.
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each time it is called into play.' '2' Thus, a single, consistent
interpretation of "willfully" in section 2(b) was necessary.2 5
Moving on, the court proceeded to provide its own interpretation
of the section 2(b) requirement and concluded that "the government
need not prove a knowing violation of the law under that section. ',21
The court's analysis began by stating that "[t]he general rule in
criminal cases is that the government need not prove a knowing
violation of the law '' 2' and by citing precedents where section 2(b)
itself had been interpreted as not requiring a knowing violation of the
law. 2' The only information outside of section 2(b) that was relevant
to the analysis was the underlying criminal provision, in this case,
section 1001." Conviction under section 2(b) required that the
defendant satisfied two mens rea requirements: a) "intentionally
caus[ing] another to commit the requisite act"; and b) "the mental
state necessary to violate the underlying section."'2 0
Before concluding that section 2(b) did not require proof of a
knowing violation of the law, the Gabriel court applied, and found
inapposite, four factors that had been discussed in Ratzlaf.2" First,
while Ratzlaf had concluded that "willfully" in the statute in question
would be "mere surplusage" if not interpreted to require a knowing
violation of the law, 12 Gabriel concluded that "willfully" had a role to
fill in section 2(b)-that "the government must prove that defendant
intentionally caused another to act., 213 Second, Ratzlaf (and Cheek)
involved very complex law, but the Gabriel court noted that "section
2(b) is quite uncomplicated. 2 4 Third, the Ratzlaf court found that
previous interpretations of the statutory term, in other contexts,
204. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994) (citations omitted) (quoted in
Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101).
205. See Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The Court cites United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1451-52 (10th Cir.
1992) (section 2(b) does not require a knowing violation of the law). Cf. United States v.
Jordan, 927 F.2d 53, 55 (2d Cir. 1991) (under section 2(b), a defendant is "as liable for [a
crime] as she would have been if she had physically [committed it herself]"); American
Surety Co. of New York v. Sullivan, 7 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand, J.) ("The
word 'willful'... means no more than that the person charged with the duty knows what
he is doing. It does not mean that, in addition, he must suppose that he is breaking the
law.").
209. Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 101.
210. Id. (emphasis omitted).
211. Id. at 101-02.
212. Id. at 102.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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required a knowing violation of the law,215 whereas the Gabriel court
found no similar precedents concerning section 2(b). 216 Finally, the
Ratzlaf court "stated that the conduct at issue was not 'inevitably
nefarious.""'2 7 In a prosecution under section 2(b), the government
would have to prove the "mental state necessary to violate the
underlying criminal statute, [and thus,] it is inevitable that the
defendant had criminal intent.,
211
As discussed in the next section, the court's analysis in Gabriel is
arguably wrong even before adding the complexities that arise in the
election law context. Nevertheless, when the issue came up again in a
prosecution for conduit contributions, the D.C. Circuit in United
States v. Hsia29 agreed with Gabriel rather than Curran.2' Rather than
following Gabriel's questionable analysis, the court relied on a
"natural reading" of sections 2(b) and 1001 and found that the
government would have to prove that the defendant both knew the
statements were false (the mens rea for section 1001) and intended to
cause the statements (the mens rea for section 2(b)). 221 It decided that
"the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse" was the
appropriate rule in the context of a prosecution under sections 2(b)
and 1001, not "Ratzlafis narrow exception 222 The court's brief analysis
of Ratzlaf focused only on the "surplusage" argument and not on the
other three arguments that Gabriel had reviewed.223 Interestingly,
there was no citation to Bryan, decided almost a year earlier. The
court seemed unaware that, even if Ratzlaf s narrow exception did not
apply to this situation, Bryan provided a broader exception to the rule
that ignorance of the law is no excuse.
To make matters even more confusing, the DOJ position on the
215. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 142-43 (1994).
216. Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 102.
217. Id. (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 144) (emphasis added).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
219. 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
220. Before Hsia the district court in D.C. had reached the opposite conclusion. See
United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 15-16 (D.D.C. 1998). The court concluded that
FECA satisfied both reasons for requiring proof of knowledge of the law being violated,
noting Congress's awareness of "the combination of the nature of the statute, which
criminalizes activity that is not inherently evil, and the complexity of the statute, which
imposes highly technical reporting requirements, present[ing] the risk that non-culpable
people might be prosecuted." Id. at 15 (citing 122 CONG. REc. 8577 (1976) (statement of
Rep. Rostenkowski) ("provisions in the [pre-1976] law that provide harsh penalties for
what may be innocent and often unknowing violations of its more technical
requirements")).
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necessary mens rea is unclear. In 1984, before DOJ had decided to
attempt to prosecute conduit contributions under general felony
statutes, the Manual on election offenses interpreted the FECA
misdemeanor provisions to require knowledge that the conduct was
culpable:
Criminal violations of the FECA differ from noncriminal
violations of it principally in the degree of criminal intent
involved. For an FECA offense to rise to a level that is
cognizable under 2 U.S.C. 437g(d), it must have been committed
with "knowing and willful" intent. However, the substantive
provisions of the Act are largely regulatory malum prohibitum
prohibitions and duties. As such, the existence of a statutory
specific intent element requires proof either that a would-be
FECA defendant had an active awareness that he was violating
the law when he committed the transgression in question, or
that he was otherwise acting with "evil" motive or purpose.224
However, the Manual also concluded that use of "surreptitious means
(such as cash, conduits, or false documentation)" proves that "a
defendant was actively aware he was violating one of the FECA's
regulatory prohibitions or duties., 25 "Regulatory prohibitions or
duties" evidently meant the prohibited sources or contribution limits,
rather than the prohibition against making a contribution in the name
of another. 6 Similar comments about the mens rea standard for
FECA misdemeanors were included in the 1988 edition of the
Manual, with no corresponding discussion for the "alternative
prosecutive theories" involving the general felony statutes.227
In its latest edition, the DOJ Manual mentioned Curran as
"demonstrat[ing] that satisfying these scienter requirements can prove
challenging., 228 Gabriel, of course, had not yet been decided, let alone
Hsia.229 However, even after Gabriel had come down, a former
Associate General Counsel in charge of enforcement at the FEC
224. D.O.J. MANUAL, 4th ed., supra note 85, at 41 (emphasis supplied).
225. Id.
226. See D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed., supra note 83, at 74. The example given concerns
the "use of conduits to conceal the fact that corporate funds were being infused into a
political campaign." Id. See also D.O.J. MANUAL, 4th ed., supra note 85, at 41.
227. See D.O.J. MANUAL, 5th ed., supra note 83, at 73-74 ("There is nothing
inherently wrongful or 'evil' about the vast majority of the conduct covered by the
campaign finance laws.").
228. D.O.J. MANUAL, 6th ed., supra note 91, at 110.
229. The Curran decision was decided on March 30, 1994, while Gabriel was not
decided until September 23, 1997; and Hsia was decided still later on May 18, 1999. United
States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89 (2d Cir.
1997); United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
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noted that "the specific intent requirement of Ratzlaf and Curran
appears to be the prevailing standard.""23 DOJ apparently agreed,
although they continued to challenge the Curran standard and were
successful in that challenge in Hsia.32
C. Why the Third Circuit Is Right, and Why It Matters
In retrospect, one of the most surprising aspects of the Circuit
Courts' analysis of the issue is their focus on Ratzlaf and, to a lesser
extent, on Cheek, to the exclusion of the other cases. 233 Curran and
Gabriel came down before Bryan, but Hsia was decided after Bryan;
and all three of the Circuit Court cases were decided after Liparota.
The Circuit Courts' focus on Ratzlaf perhaps contributed to its
opinion being interpreted in Hsia and Gabriel as a "narrow
exception," rather than part of a more universal rule.3 Curran, on the
other hand, considered the rule in Ratzlaf to be rather broad and
specifically noted that Cheek had limited its rule to complex tax code
provisions,235 while Ratzlaf was not similarly confined.236 Similarly, the
dissent in Ratzlaf pointed out that the majority opinion announced a
general rule, applicable to simple rather than complex statutory
prohibitions and therefore extending well beyond the holding in
Cheek.237 When these observations are added to similar results in
Liparota and Bryan, the characterization of Ratzlaf as a narrow
holding that should be confined to its facts appears untenable.
In this context, Gabriel contrasted Ratzlaf, where the Court "was
influenced by the 'complex of provisions in which [section 5322 is]
embedded"' with the "quite uncomplicated" section 2(b).238 But this
was clearly a misinterpretation of Ratzlaf. In its discussion of the
"complex of provisions," the Ratzlaf court was doing nothing more
230. Gross & Hong, supra note 93, at 53.
231. Craig Donsanto, Address at the Practicing Law Institute Corporate Political
Activities 1997 Program (Oct. 31, 1997) ("We have to show specifically [that defendants]
knew what the law was and that they flouted the law, that knowledge notwithstanding.")
(quoted in Gross & Hong, supra note 93, at 53).
232. This may have been due in part to intra-departmental disagreements. Mr.
Donsanto was head of the Public Integrity Section at D.O.J., while the prosecution in Hsia
was brought by the Campaign Financing Task Force. See United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp.
2d 33, 49 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd in part, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
233. Curran, 20 F.3d at 568-69.
234. Hsia, 176 F.3d at 522; Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 102.
235. Curran, 20 F.3d at 569.
236. See id. at 568-69.
237. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 156 (1994).
238. Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 102 (quoting Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141).
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than construing one section of a statute in light of the entire statute.239
In that respect, Gabriel appears to have interpreted Ratzlaf's
"complex of provisions" as equivalent to "complex provisions," which
of course it was not.24° This interpretation is supported by the Ratzlaf
dissent, which, in contrasting that decision with Cheek, stated that
"the provisions involved are perhaps among the simplest in the
United States Code.,
241
Similarly, the focus on the statutory construction arguments in
Ratzlaf appears misplaced. In context, and considering the other
Supreme Court cases in this area, the rationale for Ratzlaf is clearly
the culpability argument rather than the standard tools of statutory
construction.2 Yet Hsia entirely ignored the culpability argument. 3
Gabriel addressed it but demonstrated a fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of the culpability rule.4 As noted in
the preceding section, Gabriel said that the "inevitably nefarious"
standard would always be met: "[B]ecause a defendant will be
convicted through section 2(b) only if the defendant had the mental
state necessary to violate the underlying criminal statute, it is
inevitable that the defendant had criminal intent.2 45 But the "criminal
intent" of the underlying criminal statute (section 1001) is merely
knowledge that the statements were false, whereas the Ratzlaf
standard required conduct that was "obviously 'evil' or inherently
'bad.' 24 6 Conduct that is performed knowingly is not the same as
conduct that is morally blameworthy-that is the whole point of
Ratzlaf2 7 If making a false statement, under any circumstances, is
inherently morally blameworthy, only then can knowledge that the
statements were false be sufficient to satisfy the culpability rule of
Ratzlaf. Such an evaluation, however, is part of the application of the
culpability rule of Ratzlaf, not the determination of whether or not to
apply the rule.'l Gabriel made no real attempt to determine whether
making false statements to the government is inevitably
239. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141.
240. See Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 102.
241. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 156 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
242. Id. at 147.
243. See United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 517-28 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
244. See Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 102
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146.
247. See id. at 144-46. The court noted several examples of knowing acts, apparently
deceptive in nature, that would not necessarily be blameworthy. Id.
248. Id.
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blameworthy.249 Curran, on the other hand, stated that "[w]e see little
difference between breaking a cash transaction into segments of less
than $10,000 and making a contribution in the name of another., 25° As
discussed below, I conclude that, at least in the context of federal
election law, causing false statements by hiding the source of a
contribution is not always culpable.
The argument in Gabriel for consistent interpretation of
"willfully" in section 2(b) carries the most weight but is also ultimately
unpersuasive. 2 ' A requirement that prosecutions under sections 2(b)
and 1001 always apply the same mens rea standard does avoid some
difficulty in administration. Such an approach, however, ignores a
substantial difference between the situation in Gabriel and conduit
contributions... and demonstrates the difficulties with extending the
decision in Gabriel to the federal election law context. The statements
at issue in Gabriel were obviously false based on objective and easily
understandable facts, such as packing slips that misstated the nature of
repairs and falsely indicated that a turbine had been adequately
repaired."3 The court in Gabriel actually could have reached the same
result by applying the Ratzlaf rule because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to characterize deliberately false statements about the
quality of repairs made to crucial jet engine parts as other than
culpable.
This demonstrates why the Ratzlaf culpability rule should
overcome the desirability of consistent interpretation of mens rea
required for sections 2(b) and 1001. The scope of these sections is so
broad. 4 that it can include statements (such as those in Gabriel) that
are obviously false, as well as statements (such as those in the case of
conduit contributions) that are only recognizable as "false" by
reference to complex statutory and regulatory provisions. Consistent
interpretation of such extremely broad statutes creates problems
249. See Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 100-02.
250. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994).
251. Gabriel, 125 F.3d at 100-02.
252. See id. at 92. The defendant was charged with wire fraud, making false statements
to the FAA, and witness tampering stemming from his misrepresentations to the
government of the nature of jet engine repairs. Id.
253. See id. at 92-93.
254. See 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994) ("Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if
directly performed by him or another would be an offense ...."); 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994)
("Whoever... knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme,
or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or
representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to
contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry .... )
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because similar treatment is often afforded to types of conduct that
are very different. Indeed, the consistent interpretation of these
sections that Gabriel seems to demand could easily have allowed the
government in Cheek to have prosecuted the defendant under section
1001 rather than tax code provisions that were interpreted to require
knowledge of a violation of the specific provisions of the tax code.255
Although some counts of the indictment against Cheek were based on
failure to file tax returns, other counts were based on his W-4 forms,
which claimed excessive withholding allowances or indicated that he
was exempt from taxes. 6 These statements on W-4 forms would
clearly be subject to prosecution under section 1001 in addition to the
tax code provision utilized in Cheek.257
The broad scope of sections 2(b) and 1001 essentially presents us
with two choices. We can interpret the mens rea standard on a
context-specific basis for prosecutions under these provisions. In that
case, we will be faced with the difficulty and cost of administering the
standard but will gain more accurate results in terms of prosecuting
the appropriate conduct. Or we can interpret the mens rea standard
consistently for prosecutions under these provisions, and thereby
reduce administrative difficulty. A consistent interpretation will result
in either an overprotective standard requiring knowledge that one's
conduct is violating a specific legal duty even in those contexts where
the false statements are "inevitably nefarious" '258 or an underprotective
standard allowing prosecution that could reach a "broad range of
apparently innocent conduct."25 9
The easy answer would be to settle on a consistent,
underprotective interpretation. The risks associated with an
underprotective standard could, in theory, be addressed by
prosecutorial discretion."6 This solution, however, is not as attractive
as it appears and is fundamentally inconsistent with the culpability
rule in Ratzlaf.26' In the earlier part of the twentieth century, the
255. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 201 (1991) (finding that the standard for
statutory willfulness is the "voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty")
(quoting United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 360 (1973)).
256. See id. at 194.
257. Id. (submitting falsified W-4 forms).
258. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 136-37, 144 (1994).
259. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985) (discussing how a strict
reading of a statute without a mens rea standard would "criminalize a broad range of
apparently innocent conduct").
260. Id. at 427.
261. See Wiley, supra note 120, at 1065. Wiley finds that increased prosecutorial
discretion will give more power to prosecutors to convict the morally innocent. Id. This
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
Supreme Court routinely relied on "reliable prosecutorial discretion
as a complete answer to strict liability worries." '262 That is no longer the
case. Indeed, the culpability rule applied in Liparota, Ratzlaf, and
Bryan would be wholly unnecessary if the Court could depend on
prosecutors not to bring cases resembling the parade of horribles the
courts imagined.263
There are a number of possible reasons that courts should rely
less on prosecutorial discretion.2" The best explanation is that
prosecutorial discretion "gives prosecutors the power to convict the
morally innocent-and no one else can do anything about it. This
power is fundamentally different than a prosecutor's usual and
necessary power of deciding which culpable people to prosecute.""26
The latter decision cannot be made effectively by anyone other than
the prosecutor, but "unreviewable power to imprison the innocent" is
not something that is properly delegable to prosecutors.2" The courts
can effectively prevent that by the use of the culpability rule.267 There
are plausible arguments for not applying the rule to petty cases, such
as prosecutions for FECA misdemeanors, but strict liability is
inappropriate for serious crimes, such as prosecution of conduit
contributions under general felony statutes.'68
Fundamentally, the culpability rule matters. Inconsistent
interpretations and increased difficulty in administration seems a
small price to pay. In any event, it is unclear exactly how serious the
problem that Gabriel raised would truly be. It may well be that the
mens rea standard for prosecutions under sections 2(b) and 1001
would be inconsistent with the Ratzlaf decision, which held that a defendant would not be
culpable of the violation where he did not have knowledge of the violation and was, in
essence, morally innocent. Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 149.
262. Wiley, supra note 120, at 1058.
263. See id. at 1066-67 (discussing fear that too much prosecutorial discretion would
be a "recipe for tyranny" and lead to an "efficient strict liability" system that would make
everyone a criminal).
264. See id. at 1061-65. The possible reasons cited by Wiley include the "traditional
judicial concern that prosecutors may 'pursue their personal predilections' at the expense
of justice." Id. at 1062 (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575 (1974)). Also,
prosecutors are often inexperienced, leading many judges to see them as "unworthy
competitors" rather than trustworthy partners. Id. at 1064. Another fear is that increased
prosecutorial power could result in a tipping of the scales of justice. Id. at 1065.
265. Id. at 1065.
266. See id. at 1065-66.
267. See id. at 1068.
268. See id. at 1098-1108. Wiley argues that, although the Supreme Court has been
willing to compromise Constitutional safeguards in the case of petty crimes by creating
exceptions to the culpability rule, apart from traffic offenses, there is no "crime-petty or
otherwise-for which proof problems convincingly warrant strict liability." Id. at 1107.
[Vol. 42:841
2001] PROSECUTING CONDUIT CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 875
would only have to be split into two different contexts: those involving
a complex underlying regulatory scheme and everything else. That
division hardly seems to present an insurmountable difficulty. Without
any specific indications that "inconsistent" interpretations of these
sections would cause significant difficulties, inconsistency seems a
better solution than either an overprotective standard, deterring
effective law enforcement, or an underprotective standard,
inappropriately relying on prosecutorial discretion.
As noted previously, the culpability rule in Bryan would require a
minimum showing that the defendant in a campaign contribution case
knew her conduct was unlawful.69 The real question is whether the
higher threshold of Ratzlaf and Liparota applies in the federal
election law context. There are two potential bases for requiring the
government to show that the defendant knew of the specific legal
requirement: the first is the complexity of the underlying regulatory
scheme, and the second is the "range of apparently innocent
conduct"'27 that would be subject to prosecution without such a
requirement."' The first basis seems particularly apt here. FECA is
obviously less complex than the Internal Revenue Code, but it also
seems considerably more complex than the currency reporting and
anti-structuring provisions at issue in Ratzlaf and the food stamp
regulations in Liparota. Even the courts have expressed some degree
of difficulty in determining exactly what FECA prohibits and exactly
what constitutes a "false statement" in that respect.
272
The "range of apparently innocent conduct" aspect also argues
for adding a culpability element to sections 2(b) and 1001 when used
to prosecute conduit contributions. There may be an argument for
interpreting such false statements under a perspective of moral rigor,
in which even minor white lies would constitute culpable conduct.
Such a rigorous approach to defining culpability, however, proves too
much-it would conclude that some of the "parade of horribles" in
Ratzlaf, such as structuring cash transactions "to reduce the risk of an
269. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 196 (1998).
270. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
271. For other potential reasons for requiring proof that the defendant knew of the
specific law being violated, including that the criminal statute is malum prohibitum rather
than malum in se, see Davies, supra note 120, at 362, 390-96. The author generally
disapproves of these justifications for deviating from the "ignorance of the law is no
excuse" general rule. See id. at 396.
272. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 58 (D.D.C. 1998) ("For starters,
it is a battle to find the false statements in the indictment."), rev'd in part, 176 F.3d 517
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
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IRS audit, 273 or "to keep a former spouse unaware of his wealth,, 274
also constituted culpable conduct. The Ratzlaf court, however, clearly
concluded that such conduct was not inherently blameworthy. 27
Campaign contributions might be made through a conduit for
equally blameless reasons. For example, the true donor might wish to
avoid solicitations for future donations or publicity about her ability
to make substantial donations. It should be noted that such publicity
could lead to some of the same concerns that led to some of the
parade of horribles cited by Ratzlaf.76 It could alert a former spouse
or a potential burglar to the donor's wealth even more effectively than
a bank reporting a currency transaction greater than $10,000 because
bank currency reports are less likely to become available to the
general public than FEC contribution reports. If structuring cash
transactions can be innocent for such reasons, why not conduit
campaign contributions? Finally, a donor who is publicly connected
with Candidate A might wish to make a donation to Candidate B
without the "symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution 27 7  becoming public knowledge and causing
embarrassment to A.278
In connection with this, it is worth noting that making a campaign
contribution while maintaining anonymity is difficult to do without
using a conduit. The conduit contribution cases have relied on the
signer's name on the check as the "cause" of the false statement,
rather than some affirmative statement by the straw donor that she
was the actual source of the donation.279 Thus, to maintain anonymity
while avoiding use of a conduit, the donor would have to make the
donation in cash (not something most reformers want to encourage),
by a cashier's check (on which the issuing bank usually notes the
source's name), or by money order.28" The easiest solution, and one
273. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994).
274. Id. at 145 (1994).
275. Id. at 145-46 (reasoning that such conduct is not necessarily motivated by
criminal intent and may be conducted for legitimate reasons).
276. See supra notes 151-52, and accompanying text.
277. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976).
278. Then again, this might not be a concern. In 1999 former Senator Bob Dole, while
his wife Elizabeth was campaigning for the presidency, publicly discussed the possibility
that he might give a campaign donation to Sen. John McCain. See Richard L. Berke, As
Political Spouse, Bob Dole Strays from Campaign Script, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1999, at Al;
see also Perspectives, NEWSWEEK, May 31, 1999, at 24 (reporting Mrs. Dole's reaction as "I
told him I loved him. I told him he was in the woodshed.").
279. See, e.g., United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 54 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd in part,
176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
280. Cf. Ayres & Bulow, supra note 5, at 852-53. Such anonymous donations could be
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that could easily be blameless, would be to maintain anonymity by
having a friend or relative write a check for the donation and then
reimbursing them. That, however, is exactly the conduct that the
government can characterize as causing a false statement to be made
by campaign officials, subjecting the donor to prosecution under
sections 2(b) and 1001.21
Based on these factors, an evaluation of felony prosecution of
conduit contributions under the culpability rule of Liparota and
Ratzlaf would support the addition of an implied mens rea standard to
sections 2(b) and 1001 in the federal election law context. 2' The Third
Circuit, in Curran, got it right;283 however, the D.C. Circuit's decision
in Hsia was wrong." In felony prosecutions of conduit contributions,
the government should be required to prove that the defendant knew
of the specific legal requirement she is charged with violating. This is
not to say that any specific case should not have been prosecuted-
prosecutors may have concluded that the defendants had such
knowledge before initiating prosecution. In our judicial system,
however, this determination should be made by the jury, not theprosecutor. ,85
IV. THE PREEMPTION ARGUMENT
The preemption argument, that passage of FECA impliedly
repealed pro tanto the provisions of general criminal statutes such as
made in a "donation booth," whereby the contributor's donation would be dropped in the
"slot" of his candidate. Id. Ayres & Bulow reject such an approach as unworkable and
instead favor a system of blind trusts. Id. at 853. The blind trusts would thus ensure donor
anonymity, no matter the form in which the donation was made. See id. at 838.
281. By having a friend or relative write a check for the donation, the donor, in effect,
has created a scheme or demise to conceal his name, which is a material fact. Creating this
sort of scheme or demise is prohibited under the statutes. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 1001(a)(1)
(1994).
282. Under both opinions, the defendant must know his actions are unauthorized by
statute or regulation. This requirement denotes an implied mens rea standard, which is
used by the courts. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 433 (1985); Ratzlaf v.
United States, 510 U.S. 135, 149 (1994).
283. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 569 (3d Cir. 1994).
284. United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S.
1136 (2000). The D.C. Circuit's analysis did not require that the government have proof
that a defendant was aware of the legal requirement with which that defendant was
charged in order to obtain a conviction. Id.
285. Cf. United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 48 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd in part on
other grounds, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999), cert denied, 528 U.S. 1136 (2000). Although
recognizing the "strong presumption that prosecutors are properly discharging their official
duties," the court noted that prosecutorial discretion is subject to limitations and
constraints. Id.
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false statements and conspiracy to defraud the United States, is harder
to support than the mens rea argument of Part III. While there was at
least one circuit court supporting the position I advance on the mens
rea issue," all the courts that have addressed the preemption
argument in the context of federal election law have agreed that
FECA did not impliedly repeal the general criminal statutes.287
Nevertheless, this unanimous conclusion is wrong.
This Part begins, in Section A, with a brief discussion of a special
case of the preemption argument for the federal conspiracy statute,
often argued but ultimately unpersuasive. Section B then addresses
the general preemption argument, with a review of the cases that have
rejected such an argument. The courts have primarily relied on a
review of statutory language, legislative history, and brief citations to
precedent with minimal analysis. A closer review of the cases,
however, reveals that the courts' reliance on precedent is misplaced
and their analysis of the issue is incomplete. This section also
addresses defense efforts to rely on the one instance in which FECA
has been held to have impliedly preempted another law.2' Those
efforts, however, have been unsuccessful. The courts have rejected the
application of the reasoning in Galliano to prosecutions under general
criminal statutes.289
286. See generally Curran, 20 F.3d at 560 (requiring proof that a defendant was aware
of the existence of a reporting requirement).
287. See, e.g., Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 38-44 (where, in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 371 and 1001, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the more particular provisions of
FECA should preempt the more general statutes); Curran, 20 F.3d at 564-66 (where in a
prosecution brought under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 371, and 1001, the defendant unsuccessfully
argued that the five-year statute of limitations is preempted by FECA's three-year statute
of limitations, the court found that "FECA was not intended to preempt the general
criminal provisions"); United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18-19 (D.D.C. 1998)
(rejecting the defendant's argument that the general felony statute was preempted by the
misdemeanor provisions of the more particular FECA statute "[b]ecause congress did not
express an intent that the misdemeanor sanctions of FECA be a substitute for all other
possible criminal sanctions"); United States v. Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232, 245 (D.D.C. 1996)
(finding that the government may lawfully prosecute under the more general provisions of
18 U.S.C. § 1001, rather than the more specific provisions in FECA), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 111 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 (5th Cir.
1990) (stating that absent congressional intent, when an act violates more than one statute,
the government can choose to prosecute under either, and "the fact that one statute
prescribes a felony and the other prescribes a misdemeanor [does not] affect the
prosecutors authority to choose among statutes").
288. The court in United States v. Galliano held that the FECA qualifies or controls, in
part, the provisions of the postal fraud proscriptions contained in 39 U.S.C. § 3005. 836
F.2d 1362, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
289. Id; See Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 44 (noting defendant's Galliano preemption
argument as intriguing, but then holding that there was no legislative intent that FECA
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Although the courts have not accepted the defense arguments for
preemption," better arguments are available. Section C advances an
innovative approach to analyzing repeal by implication in the criminal
law context through an analogy to the "lesser included offense"
doctrine. Felony prosecution of conduit contributions demonstrates a
variant of that doctrine-what I describe as a theory of the "greater
included offense." Section D builds on the earlier sections to propose
a framework for analysis of implied repeal of the general criminal
statutes in 18 U.S.C. sections 2(b), 371, and 1001. Based on that
framework, this article concludes that the FECA provisions that
criminalize conduit contributions have repealed the general criminal
statutes by implication.
A. The Federal Conspiracy Statute-A Case of Self-Preemption?
Some observers and at least one court have raised an interesting
preemption argument about the federal conspiracy statute29-that the
statute preempts itself.29 The basic provision of the statute establishes
"one crime that may be committed in one of two [alternate] ways:"'2 93
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or
any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose, and one
or more of such persons do any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.9
Defendants can be prosecuted under either the "defraud" clause,
for a conspiracy to interfere with government functions, or the
"offense" clause.29' A violation of the "defraud" clause is "a felony
offense punishable by up to five years imprisonment., 296 The
displace any of the general criminal statutes).
290. See supra note 287.
291. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
292. See Lance Cole & Ross Nabatoff, Prosecutorial Misuse of the Federal Conspiracy
Statute in Election Law Cases, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 225, 236-38 (2000) (presenting
the self-preemption argument in depth).
293. United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 n.6 (D.D.C. 1998) (paraphrasing United
States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1193 (6th Cir. 1989)).
294. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994). The division into "offense" and "defraud" clauses dates
back to the origins of the conspiracy statute. See Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 30, 14
Stat. 484. (providing "[t]hat if two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense
against the laws of the United States, or to defraud the United States in any manner
whatsoever" (emphasis added)).
295. Cole & Nabatoff, supra note 292, at 236-37.
296. Id. at. 237.
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maximum punishment for a violation of the "offense" clause,
however, depends on the underlying offense. In 1948 Congress yielded
to judicial criticism and amended the statute to add a key limitation:
"If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such
conspiracy shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for
such misdemeanor.
297
Lance Cole and Ross Nabatoff argue that the language of section
371 "indicates that Congress intended that a conspiracy to commit an
election law offense, which is a misdemeanor, should be punished as a
misdemeanor conspiracy offense., 298 This argument is normatively
appealing but analytically suspect. Congress's 1948 change clearly
limits the punishment for convictions under the "offense" clause,
when the underlying offense, the object of the conspiracy, is a
misdemeanor.2 9 At this point, a key question must be asked: does the
limitation also apply when the object of the conspiracy would be a
misdemeanor but the conspiracy is charged under the "defraud"
clause?
To answer this question affirmatively as a necessary conclusion
from the 1948 statutory change, as Cole and Nabatoff do,3°° seems to
require another premise, for which there are at least two obvious
candidates. One can argue that Congress intended the limitation to
apply to both the "offense" clause and the "defraud" clause.
Alternatively, one can argue that the "offense" clause and the
"defraud" clause are mutually exclusive: if the object of the conspiracy
can be classified as a misdemeanor, the conspiracy must be charged
under the "offense" clause and thus is subject to the limitation. Cole
and Nabatoff are not entirely clear about which of these premises
underlies their conclusion, although their article shows traces of
both.3 °1 Unfortunately, neither is as impregnable as they seem to
297. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994) (added by amendments of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat.
701; Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. 103-3222, title XXXIII, § 330016(1)(L), 108 Stat. 2147).
298. Cole & Nabatoff, supra note 292, at 238.
299. See id. This is supported by both the legislative history and the judicial criticism
that precipitated the amendment. Id. at 236.
300. Id. at 259 (concluding that Congress did not intend for prosecutors to use the
defraud clause to obtain felony convictions for misdemeanor election law violations).
301. As to the first potential premise, that Congress intended the 1948 limitation to
apply to both clauses, see id. at 238, 243 (discussing Congressional intent). As to the second
potential premise, that the "offense" and "defraud" clauses are mutually exclusive, see id.
at 247-48 (discussing a Sixth Circuit case which reached that conclusion). Cole and
Nabatoff, however, do not explicitly adopt either of these premises. Their final conclusion
is that the 1948 statutory change (which by its literal terms limits only prosecutions under
the "offense" clause) prohibits the transformation of a misdemeanor conspiracy charge
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assume.
By its terms alone, the limitation would seem to apply only to
convictions under the "offense" clause. After all, section 371 refers to
"the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy."3" Certainly, Congress could have drafted this provision
more clearly if its intent was to apply to the "defraud" clause as well.
Cole and Nabatoff point to instances where prosecutors turned
misdemeanors into felonies through use of the conspiracy statute and
argue that frustration with these results led to the 1948 change.3 3 That
history, however, is not inconsistent with a remedy, the 1948
amendment, applied only to the "offense" clause. The problem that
existed in 1948 arose not from the existence of dual clauses in the
statute, but from the single, excessive penalty." Indeed, the cases that
Cole and Nabatoff cite all seem to have been charged under the
"offense" clause.3 5
This analysis may seem like a narrow reading of the cases.
Certainly, the fact that courts criticized charging these conspiracies as
felonies3' does not mean that the courts would not have also criticized
charging conspiracies brought under the "defraud" clause as felonies.
On the other hand, it is also plausible that Congress would have
consciously decided that a lighter penalty should be available only for
conspiracies brought under the "offense" clause. Objects of
conspiracies, under the framework of section 371, can be divided into
three categories: 1) criminal offenses which do not defraud the United
States; 2) actions which defraud the United States but are not criminal
offenses; and 3) criminal offenses which also defraud the United
States. There is no intrinsic reason that Congress could not have
decided to treat the third category as more like the second category
into a felony by using the "defraud" clause, but it is not entirely clear how they reach that
conclusion. Id. at 238. As discussed in the text, their conclusion is normatively attractively
but does not seem to be a logical necessity.
302. Id. (emphasis added).
303. Id. at 231-36 (discussing misuse of the conspiracy statute during prohibition and
the judiciary's growing discomfort with increasing conspiracy prosecutions).
304. See id. at 232 ("Subsequent courts inferred that Congress's silence concerning the
punishment for a conspiracy conviction meant that a conspiracy to commit any offense
against the United States, whether misdemeanor or felony, could be punished as a
felony.")
305. See, e.g., Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 441 (1949); Pinkerton v.
United States, 151 F.2d 499, 500-01 (5th Cir. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 640 (1946); United
States ex rel. Mayer v. Glass, 25 F.2d 941, 942 (3d Cir. 1928); United States v. Motlow, 10
F.2d 657, 658 (7th Cir. 1926); Welter v. United States, 4 F.2d 342, 342 (8th Cir. 1925);
Murry v. United States, 282 F. 617, 617 (8th Cir. 1922).
306. Cole & Nabatoff, supra note 292, at 234.
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rather than the first. Conduct that interferes with a governmental
function has often been seen as more serious than comparable
conduct that harms only private citizens." That distinction might be
more significant to Congress than whether the activity had been
specifically prohibited in the criminal code. This is not to argue that
the 1948 amendment was definitely not intended to cover both clauses
of the conspiracy statute, but, clearly, an implied premise that the
amendment definitely was intended to cover both clauses is far from
certain.
The second alternative argument, that the "offense" clause and
"defraud" clause are mutually exclusive, is equally problematic. There
is, in its favor, one case that seems to have accepted this argument. In
United States v. Minarik, the court concluded that "the 'offense' and
'defraud' clauses as applied to the facts of this case are mutually
exclusive. 31 8 Thus, prosecutors must "treat[] conspiracies to commit
specific offenses (which are also arguably general frauds) exclusively
under the offense clause of § 371." 3 9
The Minarik court, and an article by Professor Abraham
Goldstein"' that influenced it, identifies three reasons for treating the
clauses as mutually exclusive. First, it is necessary to avoid "multiple
convictions and unnecessary confusion" in cases of "conspiracies to
commit specific offenses."3"' Second, the "defraud" clause was
307. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 5K2.7 (1998) (providing for an upward departure from
sentencing guidelines for conduct that "resulted in a significant disruption of a
governmental function").
308. 875 F.2d 1186, 1187 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis added). The portion of the court's
conclusion that has been emphasized here, as discussed below, has been seen by other
courts as critical.
309. Id. at 1194.
310. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405
(1959). Goldstein argues that a more "far reaching solution may be found" to the problem
of multiple offenses by reading both the "offense" and "defraud" portions of the statute as
it has in fact been applied in the courts-as mutually exclusive. Id. at 448-50. He points out
that courts have read the conspiracy statute as creating a single offense (which can be
committed two different ways) rather than two offenses; thus, a single agreement with
multiple objects is only a single offense and cannot be punished by multiple sentences. Id.
at 449. He argues that this reading of the conspiracy statute inferentially supports an
interpretation that the two clauses are mutually exclusive, although courts have not
adopted such an interpretation. Id. at 449-50. Under his proposed reading, prosecutions
could be brought for either a conspiracy to commit an offense or a conspiracy to defraud,
with the latter available only where the object of the conspiracy does not constitute some
other "offense." Id. at 449. This "alternative structure" would provide the "means [to]
check[] the growth of the 'defraud' portion." Id. at 450.
311. Id. This, in turn, is the result of two fundamental interpretations of the conspiracy
statute: that the two clauses create one offense, not two, but are nonetheless disjunctive.
"Thus an individual whose alleged wrongful agreement is covered by the offense clause
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established when the criminal code "had not elaborated specific fraud
offenses. 3 12 "In light of later legislation creating numerous specific
fraud statutes, the 'defraud' portion of the statute should be viewed
'as an interim measure protecting the [g]overment until such time as
Congress has been able to deal more specifically with a given
problem.' 3.3 Finally, "[c]ongressional intent [in passing the 1948
amendment] will be defeated if the government can prosecute under
the defraud clause conduct which Congress has isolated and defined
as a misdemeanor.,
314
These arguments are not as powerful as the Minarik court
imagined. The "multiple convictions and unnecessary confusion"
argument requires additional justification. To enforce the rule against
convicting a defendant under both clauses for a single conspiracy, thus
avoiding "multiple convictions and unnecessary confusion," the courts
might simply leave the choice of which offense to pursue to the
prosecutor. Thus, this argument must, in the end, rely on concerns
about prosecutorial abuse. 315 The argument that the "defraud" clause
will swallow the entire conspiracy statute ignores the fact that not all
"conduct which Congress has isolated and defined as a
misdemeanor ,311 can necessarily be construed as interfering with a
governmental function. There will always be some conspiracies to
commit misdemeanors that cannot be charged under the "defraud"
clause.
Despite these questions, the argument that the two clauses of the
conspiracy statute are mutually exclusive is still normatively attractive.
Unfortunately, it is also contrary to common and well-established
themes in American criminal law-that criminal statutes often
overlap, that such overlap is insufficient by itself to demonstrate
implied repeal, and that when conduct violates more than one
criminal statute the prosecutor has discretion to choose which to
(because covered by a specific offense defined by Congress), as well as arguably by the
broad defraud clause, cannot be convicted or punished for both." Minarik, 875 F.2d at
1194.
312. Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1194.
313. Id. (quoting Goldstein, supra note 310, at 450) (relying on Goldstein's "interim
measure" argument in viewing the "defraud" porting of § 371 as a gap filling provision).
Cf. Ted E. Molz, Comment, The Mail Fraud Statute: An Argument for Repeal by
Implication, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 983 (1997) (making a "gapfilling" argument with respect to
the mail fraud statute).
314. Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1194.
315. See supra section III.C (discussing prosecutorial abuse).
316. See Minarik, 875 F.2d at 1194. The court stated that "[c]ongressional intent will be
defeated if the government can prosecute under the defraud clause conduct which
Congress has isolated and defined as a misdemeanor." Id.
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charge."' Perhaps for that reason, the Minarik argument has been
almost universally rejected, or more precisely, severely limited."'
Courts dealing with conspiracy prosecutions under the "defraud"
clause have routinely limited the dicta in Minarik to situations
satisfying three characteristics: 1) shifting theories of prosecution by
the government; 2) narrow scope of activity; and 3) technical
requirements for which more specific notice is needed. 9 The Minarik
argument, that a conspiracy charge for defrauding the United States
must be reconstituted as a conspiracy to violate the misdemeanor
provisions of FECA, has been frequently raised in prosecutions of
conduit contributions in recent years-and just as frequently
rejected.320
The argument that the "offense" clause of the conspiracy statute
preempts the "defraud" clause is a difficult one to make. Even if
successful, though, it would have little practical effect on prosecutions
of conduit contributions, since these also frequently include charges
under the false statements statute,321 which also carries a five year
maximum penalty.322 It is therefore necessary to look for a preemption
argument that will be both stronger and broader than Minarik. Such
317. The most prominent, and most often cited, statement of these themes is probably
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 118-22 (1979).
318. See, e.g., United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55, 61 n.8 (D.D.C. 1998); United
States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 53 n.21 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 176 F.3d
517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
319. See, e.g., United States v. Khalife, 106 F.3d 1300, 1304 (6th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Hurley, 957 F.2d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Derezinski, 945 F.2d 1006,
1010 (8th Cir. 1991); see also Todd R. Russell & 0. Carter Snead, Federal Criminal
Conspiracy, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 739, 747 & n.47 (1998).
320. See, e.g., Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 61 n.8; Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 53 n.21. Cole &
Nabatoff contend that Minarik has been "neglected." See Cole & Nabatoff, supra note 292,
at 247. Cole and Nabatoff imply that the Minarik argument has been rejected only when
the conduct alleged consists of more than "garden-variety election law violation cases." Id.
at 244 & n.136. However, Minarik has not been "neglected," so much as rejected. Hsia
clearly based its rejection of Minarik in part not only on the breadth of conduct alleged,
but also on the fact that the government had not repeatedly changed its theory of the case
without clearly alleging the specific functions impeded, thus prejudicing the defendant.
Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 53 n.21. Further, Trie, which rejected the Minarik argument "[f]or
the reasons discussed in" Hsia, (see Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 61 n.8), did not involve the same
interference with the functions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service that Cole
and Nabatoff see as the distinguishing characteristic of Hsia. See Cole & Nabatoff, supra
note 292, at 244 n.136.
321. FECA conduit contribution cases that also included charges under 18 U.S.C. §
1001 include United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 562 (3d Cir. 1994); Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d
at 36; Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 57; United States v. Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232, 237 (D.D.C.
1996), affd in part and rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v.
Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 214 (5th Cir. 1990).
322. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
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general preemption arguments have been advanced in the conduit
contribution cases, although unsuccessfully.3" The remainder of this
Part looks at those arguments and demonstrates why the courts
should accept them.
B. The Current State of Case Law
Defendants have raised the preemption argument in at least five
prosecutions of conduit contributions,32 but, despite sympathy from
some of the courts for these arguments,325 the defense lost every
time."6 The court's analysis of implied repeal in United States v. Hsia
was more thorough than in other cases.327 There, the court started with
a general framework for preemption analysis:
Ordinarily, general criminal provisions remain available to
supplement a specific statutory scheme unless there is evidence
either (1) that Congress expressly intended to preempt a general
statute with the more specific statutory scheme, or (2) that there
is what the Supreme Court has labeled "a positive repugnancy"
between the provisions of the specific statutory scheme and the
more general statutes such that Congress must have intended to
repeal the more general provisions by implication. The parties
here agree that when Congress enacted FECA it did not
expressly repeal the more general criminal provisions and that
repeal by implication is not favored.
The defendant's arguments for, and thus the court's analysis of,
implied repeal were limited to "the pervasive First Amendment
implications of federal election regulation" '329 and, specifically, an
analysis of Galliano.33° There was no discussion of or speculation
323. See supra note 286.
324. Id.
325. See Curran, 20 F.3d at 565 ("[D]efendant's position has a certain logic and sense
of fairness to it."); Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 44 ("[T]he defendant's preemption argument is
intriguing."); United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 18 (D.D.C. 1998) ("[T]here may be
some intuitive force to Mr. Trie's argument.").
326. See Curran, 20 F.3d at 564-66; Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 218-19; Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d
at 38-44; Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 18-19; Oakar, 924 F. Supp. at 245.
327. The court devoted nearly six full pages of the opinion to discussing the
preemption argument. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 38-44. In contrast, the depth of analysis
given in the other conduit cases range from as little as a two-paragraph summary dismissal
(Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 18-19; Okar, 924 F. Supp. 2d at 245), to approximately one-half
page (Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 218-19), to approximately two and one-half pages (Curran, 20
F.3d at 563-456).
328. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 38-39 (citations omitted).
329. Id. at 39.
330. See id. at 42-44.
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about what factors, other than those addressed in Galliano, might lead
to "positive repugnancy" and, therefore, implied repeal.3"
Galliano involved a statute that allowed the Postal Service, if it
concluded a person was "obtaining money or property through the
mail by means of false representations, '33 2 to issue an order that
would: 1) direct the postmaster to return undelivered any mail
addressed to the person; and 2) require the person to cease and desist
from the solicitation.333 The Postal Service had applied the statute
against mailings by an independent political action committee
("PAC") soliciting contributions, concluding that the organization
name used for the mailings and the absence of certain disclaimers
were misleading; it was, as far as anyone involved knew, the first case
"applying section 3005 to solicitations for political contributions. '34
After the federal district court upheld the agency's determination, the
PAC appealed to the D.C. Circuit, which held that "the Postal
Service, in its enforcement of 39 U.S.C. § 3005, may not impose
constraints upon the names or disclaimers of organizations mailing
solicitations for political contributions beyond those imposed by
FECA. 33
5
Then-Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg carefully tied her finding of
preemption to specific factors.36 First, the FEC was "the exclusive
administrative arbiter of questions concerning the name
identifications and disclaimers of organizations soliciting political
contributions," which were requirements specifically addressed by
FECA.337 Second, the Postal Service procedures provided less
protection for First Amendment concerns than did the FEC's, as the
Postal Service had no provision for conciliation or judicial
determination of sanctions.38 Implied preemption "reconcile[d] the
two statutes in a manner that reduces constitutional doubt. 33 9 Third,
the FECA name and disclaimer requirements represented "[a] fine
balance of interests [including the First Amendment] ... deliberately
struck by Congress" and any further requirements imposed by the
Postal Service would invade "a safe haven [for] candidates and
331. See id. at 39-44.
332. 39 U.S.C. § 3005(a) (1994).
333. Id.
334. United States v. Galliano, 836 F.2d 1362, 1366 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
335. Id. at 1367.
336. See id. at 1369-70.
337. Id. at 1370.
338. See id.
339. See id. at 1369.
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political organizations.""
As pointed out in Hsia, these factors do not apply well to conduit
contribution cases.34' The FEC's exclusive authority applies to the civil
administration of FECA, not criminal penalties. 2 The DOJ has the
authority for criminal prosecution, whether under FECA or the
general criminal statutes.3 ' The constitutional problem associated with
different levels of procedural protection disappears-a criminal
prosecution of these cases, whether misdemeanor or felony, will
always be a judicial proceeding.3' Finally, the FEC and Postal Service
regulations were inconsistent regarding what was prohibited, but the
general criminal statutes and FECA provisions both prohibited
conduit contributions.34
Other than Hsia's review of Galliano, the courts rejecting the
preemption argument have generally limited their analysis of the issue
to examinations of FECA's statutory language and legislative
history. 6  The courts have never found clear evidence of
Congressional intent that FECA preempt Title 18 of the United States
Code. 3 The conclusion in United States v. Curran was typical:
In sum, an examination of the legislative history of the
Election Campaign Act and its amendments uncovers no
express evidence that the Act was intended to preempt the
general criminal provisions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b), 371, or
1001. Finding therefore that neither statutory language nor
history support the defendant's arguments ....
340. Id. at 1370.
341. See United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd in part, 176





346. The courts' analyses also often addressed the broad discretion afforded
prosecutors to choose under which of two or more available statutes to prosecute a
defendant. This topic is, of course, beyond the scope of this Article, which addresses only
the issue of whether two or more statutes (i.e., FECA as well as the general criminal
statutes) are available, or whether the general criminal statutes have been preempted in
this context.
347. See Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 44; see also United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566
(3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v.
Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 19 (D.D.C. 1998).
348. Curran, 20 F.3d at 566 (emphasis added); see also Hopkins, 916 F.2d at 218
("There is no indication in the federal election laws that Congress intended them to
supplant the general criminal statutes found in Title 18."); Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 19 (the
court found no "evidence that Congress expressly intended to preempt a general statute
with a more specific statutory scheme"). Furthermore, "Congress did not express an intent
that the misdemeanor sanctions of FECA be a substitute for all other possible criminal
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
That essentially ended the argument, although in some instances the
court also cited to precedent that supported their "no preemption"
conclusion.349 A brief review of one of those precedents is instructive.
In United States v. Hansen, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
Ethics in Government Act ("EIGA")35 ° does not preempt the false
statements statute."' Curran and the court of appeals in Hsia both
cited this decision, apparently reasoning that EIGA was sufficiently
like FECA that Hansen had significant persuasive value.352 On closer
examination, however, that reliance appears misplaced. The court in
Hansen relied at least in part on factors that are distinguishable from
prosecutions of conduit contributions. Then-Judge Antonin Scalia
began by noting the "venerable rule, frequently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court, that repeals by implication are not favored." '353
Because of the assumption that Congress "will expressly designate the
provisions whose application it wishes to suspend .... [the court] will
not readily conclude that it did so by implication.""3 4 Express repeal,
however, was not required, as long as there was "some indication of
implicit repeal strong enough to overcome the contrary
presumption."'5
The court discussed a variety of potential indications of implicit
repeal, finding none persuasive. 6 Most relevant to the topic of this
Article was the implication from the mere existence of a specific
remedy in EIGA for the alleged conduct, which, the defendant
argued, "'appears, on its face, to contain the complete sanction that
Congress has prescribed for any knowing and willful falsificiation."'357
That argument also was insufficient. For one thing, the court noted
that EIGA and the false statements statute "combine to produce a
natural progression in penalties." '358 Failure to file an EIGA form
sanctions." Id. "Nor is there any indication in the language or legislative history of FECA
to indicate that Congress intended the criminal provisions of the Act to displace any of the
more general federal criminal provisions in Title 18 of the United States Code." Hsia, 24 F.
Supp. 2d at 44.
349. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 945-48 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see also
United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 525 (D.D.C. 1998); Curran, 20 F.3d at 565-66.
350. Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of Titles 2, 5, 18, 16, and 28).
351. See Hansen, 772 F.2d at 945-48.
352. See Curran, 20 F.3d at 565; Hsia, 176 F.3d at 525.
353. Hansen, 772 F.2d at 944 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
354. Id. at 945.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 945-49.
357. Id. at 945 (quoting the appellant's brief).
358. Id.
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would be punishable only under EIGA itself, while lying on the form
would also be punishable under the false statements statute.359 The
court also relied on the fact that EIGA provided only a civil sanction,
which was "less suggestive of an intent to displace § 1001 than the
attachment of a criminal sanction would be."3 ° In the context of
conduit contributions, of course, there are not two analogous ways to
violate the law. Since the only action the defendant need take involves
the issuance of a check (for which there is no affirmative duty),
prosecution can only be based on "lying" on the check, not on "failing
to issue a check." Thus, there is no "natural progression of penalties"
between FECA and the general criminal statutes. Further, FECA
provides not only a civil sanction as in EIGA but also a criminal
misdemeanor sanction. Although the existence of a criminal sanction
is not necessarily sufficient for a finding of implied repeal,361 it is at
least more suggestive of such. Therefore, the analysis in Hansen is less
persuasive in this context than the citations by the courts indicate.
Another instructive case on the implied repeal of statutes is
United States v. Borden Co.,362 cited by Hsia for its statement of the
standards.' Although Hsia did no more than briefly cite Borden," a
brief look at that case is illuminating. Although the Borden opinion
did not clearly define standards for "positive repugnancy," it did more
than simply state the principle and conclude that there had been no
implied repeal or established de facto per se rule against repeal by
implication.365 Instead, the Borden court analyzed the two overlapping
statutes in some detail to find that there has been no implied repeal."
Borden was a prosecution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for
combination in restraint of commerce involving the transportation
and distribution of fluid milk.367 The defendants claimed that the
Sherman Act did not apply to the milk industry as a result of the
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA"). 68 The
Court's analysis focused on the fact that the AMAA provided for
marketing agreements and orders entered into by the Secretary of
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Hansen cited four cases where the existence of criminal sanctions had been
rejected as a basis for implied repeal. See id. at 945-46.
362. 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
363. See Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 38-39.
364. Id. at 39.
365. Borden, 308 U.S. at 196-203.
366. Id. at 199-202.
367. Id. at 190-91 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997)).
368. 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. §§ 671-674 (1999).
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Agriculture, and that any such marketing agreements were expressly
deemed lawful and not in violation of the antitrust laws.369 However,
"the field covered by the Agricultural Act is not coterminous with that
covered by the Sherman Act. '37 When the Secretary participated in a
marketing agreement, his involvement would provide protection
against any restraint on commerce; if there were no marketing
agreement and thus no involvement by the Secretary, no protection
would be afforded by the AMAA.371 In finding erroneous the district
court's conclusion that the Secretary's unexercised discretion under
the AMAA "wholly destroys the operation of... the Sherman Act,"
the Court stated that it "[could] not believe that Congress intended to
create 'so great a breach in historic remedies and sanctions' by also
stripping the milk industry of the protection afforded by the Sherman
Act.
372
Although the Court did not clearly say so, this analysis suggests
that in a specific instance where the AMAA did provide protection
because of a marketing agreement, the Sherman Act might indeed
have been impliedly repealed pro tanto, even if the AMAA had not
expressly provided for such repeal. The Court noted that
[a]s to agreements and arrangements not thus agreed upon or
directed by the Secretary, the Agricultural Act in no way
impinges upon the prohibitions and penalties of the Sherman
Act, and its condemnation of private action in entering into
combinations and conspiracies which impose the prohibited
restraint upon interstate commerce remains untouched.73
The express limitations upon the Sherman Act in the AMAA were
confirmation of this analysis,3 74 as well as additional evidence that
broader limitations were not intended. While the Court did not
explicitly say that its conclusion (that the AMAA did not repeal the
Sherman Act pro tanto) would flow from the structure of the statutes
alone, it is at least plausible that the Court would have reached the
369. See Borden, 308 U.S. at 199-201.
370. Id. at 200.
371. See id. at 199-200.
372. Id. at 198 (quoting General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S.
49, 61 (1932)).
373. Id. at 200 (emphasis added).
374. See id. ("It is not necessary to labor the point, for the Agricultural Act itself
expressly defines the extent to which its provisions make the antitrust laws inapplicable.")
(emphasis added).
375. See id. at 201 ("If Congress had desired to grant any further immunity, Congress
doubtless would have said so.").
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same result even without the express limitations in the AMAA.376
While the discussion in this Section does not alone answer the
question of whether FECA impliedly repealed the general criminal
statutes, the "repeal by implication" cases such as Hansen, Borden,
and Galliano, (relied on by the "conduit contribution" cases) suggest
some things about the proper approach to the analysis. First, the
analysis should extend beyond a mere search of the statutory language
and legislative history for explicit indications-express repeal is not
required. Second, various structural considerations are relevant to the
determination. For example, if the specific statute prohibits no
conduct that would not also be prohibited by the general statute, or if
both statutes provided the same type of penalties (criminal versus
civil), the likelihood that Congress intended the specific statute to
repeal the general statute pro tanto is greater. However, the vast
majority of courts that have considered the implied repeal argument
in conduit contribution cases have neither undertaken detailed
analysis and comparison of the respective statutes nor offered a
framework for such.377
C. The Greater Included Offense Theory
Prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys are well familiar with
the doctrine of the "lesser included offense. 3 78 Although some aspects
of the doctrine are subject to dispute, the fundamentals are clear.
Under appropriate circumstances, the judge instructs the jury that
they may consider, as an alternative to the offense specified in the
indictment, "a less serious, but uncharged offense" which is a
component part of the charged offense.379 For example, depending on
the jurisdiction and the facts of the case, either side might ask that the
jury be given the choice of conviction of manslaughter, although the
only charge in the indictment was for murder. Such a lesser included
offense charge may have tactical advantages for either side-to avoid
376. See id. at 203-06. The Court turns its discussion to whether the provisions of the
Capper-Volstead Act repeal the Sherman Act with respect to dairy cooperatives. Id. at
203. The Court found that Capper-Volstead Act allows farmers to act cooperatively in
getting goods to market but "cannot be deemed to authorize any combination or
conspiracy with other persons in restraint of trade that these producers may see fit to
devise." Id. at 204-05. As such, the Court held that it "cannot find in the Capper-Volstead
Act, any more than in the Agricultural Act, an intention to declare immunity for the
combinations and conspiracies charged in the present indictment." Id. at 204.
377. See supra notes 286-90.
378. For background on this doctrine, see generally Janis L. Ettinger, In Search of a
Reasoned Approach to the Lesser Included Offense, 50 BROOK. L. REV. 191 (1984).
379. Id. at 192.
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the risk to the government of complete acquittal or the risk to the
defendant of a murder conviction."'
Neither commentators nor judges tend to give much attention to
the fact that "lesser included" has two parts-that the offense must be
both "included" (satisfied by a subset of the elements of the offense
charged) and "lesser" (providing a less severe penalty)."' In
discussions of the doctrine, virtually all of the attention is devoted to
"included," and virtually none is devoted to "lesser. 3 2 The reason for
this seems obvious-we naturally assume that any "included" offense
will also be "lesser." If crime A includes the same elements as crime B
plus an additional (aggravating) element, normally crime A will carry
a more severe penalty. If the penalty for crime B is more severe, why
would prosecutors charge anyone under crime A, requiring
themselves to prove an additional element in order to lower the
penalty?383
That underlying assumption, that a crime with added elements
will normally have a more severe penalty, is the basis for what I
propose-in the context of preemption analysis-as the doctrine of
the "greater included offense." Under certain circumstances, we
should recognize that a criminal provision was, more likely than not,
intended to preempt a greater included offense-an "included"
offense that carries a more severe penalty-that was enacted earlier
than the preempting statute. This assumption should, at a minimum,
be considered substantial evidence weighing against the normal
presumption against repeal-by-implication and perhaps sufficient by
380. See. id. at 192-93.
381. See id. at 196.
382. For example, the discussion in Ettinger focuses almost entirely on the meaning
(and implications for other doctrines) of "included" with virtually no discussion of "lesser."
See Ettinger, supra note 378, at 198-209. For rare acknowledgements of both elements of
the standard, see United States v. Cady, 495 F.2d 742, 747 (8th Cir. 1974) and Walker W.
Jones, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes Lesser Offenses "Necessarily Included" in Offense
Charged, Under Rule 13 (c) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 11 A.L.R. FED. 173
§ 3(b) (1972).
383. A prosecutor might charge the defendant with crime A to avoid imposing an
unfair penalty (assuming that prosecutors think in these terms). However, until recently
that was not necessary. The prosecutor could simply charge the defendant with crime B but
avoid an unfair penalty by reliance on her discretion in recommending, and the judge's
discretion in imposing, a lower sentence, comparable to that established for crime A. This
may no longer be a feasible approach, as a result of the development in 1987 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which have reduced a prosecutor's and judge's discretion in
sentencing. Since the FECA provisions were enacted before the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, however, the lower penalty for violating FECA cannot be explained as a
decision to provide prosecutors with a way around the harsh implications of the sentencing
guidelines.
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itself to rebut that presumption.
One condition precedent for invoking "greater included offense"
doctrine should be that the criminal statute in question must be a
broad provision "covering a more generalized spectrum."3" This is an
indication that the original statute may have been intended as a
"gapfilling" statute broadly drawn to cover a wide range of behavior
until Congress had considered the appropriate penalties for specific
subsets of the behavior. Subsequent particularized statutes then fill in
the interstices with Congress's particularized judgment.385 Thus, if a
subsequent statute either adds elements to the original offense or
restricts operation to a small portion of the original offense while at
the same time providing for a less severe penalty, an intent to preempt
the original statute is the most logical explanation.
This perspective may help explain why, in preemption arguments,
courts and commentators have occasionally been at pains to explain
that it was harder to prove a violation of the general criminal statutes
than of FECA. For example, in United States v. Hopkins, the court
noted that
the defendants in this case violated not only the election laws
but also committed acts that constituted independent violations
of the more general criminal statutes of Title 18. Conviction
under those sections requires proof of elements not required to
prove a violation of the election laws. The offenses under Title
18 thus stand wholly apart and separate from any violation of
the federal election laws.386
However, the court never explained exactly what additional elements
would be needed for the general criminal statutes. While additional
elements might be necessary for the charges under sections 657 and
1006,"8 that would almost certainly not be the case for the charges
under sections 371 and 1001.3'
The DOJ Manual also alludes to additional elements required for
conviction under the general criminal statutes:
While there are several advantages to using these felony
theories, it is important to emphasize that their use requires
proof of additional elements beyond those required by FECA's
misdemeanor provision. Proving these additional elements may
be difficult in campaign financing cases.
384. Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976).
385. See Molz, supra note 313, at 985.
386. United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 218-19 (5th Cir. 1990).
387. See id. at 211 & nn.4-5.
388. See id. at 211 & nn.2-3.
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[W]hen the conduct is charged under section 371 or 1001, the
proof must also show that the defendant intended to disrupt and
impede the lawful functioning of the FEC (section 371), or that
the defendant willfully made, or caused another to make, a false
statement regarding the illegal donation to the FEC (sections
1001, 2(b)).39
However, the discussion that follows that statement focuses on
Curran as demonstrating that "satisfying these scienter requirements
can prove challenging."3" The Manual makes no attempt to show that
any requirement other than mens rea will be difficult to prove.39' As
discussed below, other requirements of the general criminal statutes
are almost inevitably satisfied.39 As discussed in Part III, the law is not
clear on whether the false statements statute requires anything more
than knowledge of the facts that make the statement false. The mens
rea required by the FECA misdemeanor statute, however, clearly
seems to require knowledge of the law being violated.393 Since even
Curran only interpreted the required mens rea for the false statements
statute as extending to knowledge of the reporting requirements of
FECA , it is difficult to see how this constitutes a "challenging"
addition to the proof requirements.
The FECA prohibition of contributing in the name of another in
comparison with the false statements and conspiracy to defraud the
United States statutes provides a clear example of the greater
included offense doctrine. Both of the general statutes have an
extremely broad reach, satisfying the precondition for the doctrine.
Within the context of conduit contribution prosecutions, these
offenses have the following elements:
0 False statements: 1) "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any
department or agency of the United States;" 2) "knowingly and
willfully;" 3) "makes any false ... statements;" 4) that are
material.9
389. D.O.J. MANUAL, 6th ed., supra note 91, at 109-10.
390. Id. at 110.
391. Id.
392. See infra notes 395-97 and accompanying text.
393. See supra Part 11I.
394. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 567 (3d Cir. 1994).
395. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
Although materiality is explicitly stated as an element of those violations of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 proscribed only by the first clause of that statute, the [courts] have
held that the falsehood in question in a charge brought under the second or third
clause of § 1001 must also relate to a material fact. Thus, the test of
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" Conspiracy to defraud the United States: 1) "two or more persons
conspire;" 2) "to defraud the United States, or any agency
thereof in any manner or for any purpose;" and 3) commit "any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy.""
* FECA misdemeanor: 1) "make a contribution in the name of
another person;" 2) "knowingly and willfully," 3) involving
"contribution[s] 
. . . aggregating $2,000 or more during a
calendar year.,
397
The elements of these three offenses are quite different, but on
examination it is clear that a violation of the FECA misdemeanor will
almost inevitably result in violations of the other two.
Start with a comparison of the FECA misdemeanor to the false
statements statute. When someone makes a contribution through a
conduit, the campaign will list the conduit's name on reports to the
FEC.398 That name itself constitutes a false statement.399 The fact that
the statement is on a report filed with the FEC means that it is "within
the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States."4"
As discussed above, "knowingly and willfully" under the FECA
misdemeanor statute will be at least as high a standard of culpability
as "knowingly and willfully" under the false statements statute.4'
The materiality requirement of section 1001 will also be met. In
interpreting section 1001, many courts have defined materiality in a
manner that can be summarized as having "a natural tendency to
influence or be capable of influencing the government agency or
department in question. 40'2 Actual reliance by the agency is, therefore,
not required.40'3 The names of contributors (as opposed to, say, their
addresses) are clearly significant facts that would influence the FEC's
materiality.., has been held applicable to every violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001
regardless of the clause involved.
Lewis J. Heisman, Annotation, What Constitutes a 'Material' Fact for Purposes of 18 USCS
§ 1001, Relating to Falsifying or Concealing Facts in Matter Within Jurisdiction of United
States Department or Agency, 49 A.L.R. FED. 622 § 4 (1980).
396. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
397. The first element comes from 2 U.S.C. § 441f (1994), the actual prohibition. The
last two elements come from § 437g(d)(1)(A) (1994), which provides criminal penalties for
violating "any provision of this Act," including § 441f.
398. See United States v. Hsia, 176 F.3d 517, 522 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that a
political campaign listed names of conduits, rather than true donors, on reports as a result
of an alleged conduit contribution scheme).
399. See id. ("The false statements here are the political committees' reports
identifying certain listed names as sources of specific contributions ....
400. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
401. See supra notes 426-28 and accompanying text.
402. Heisman, supra note 395, at § 3.
403. See id.
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actions. How else could the campaign reports be used to prevent
corruption, help voters identify the sources of contributions, and
detect violations of contribution limits/prohibitions-the very
government interests which Buckley said justify the disclosure
requirements?
41
Materiality in this sense is quite distinct from the $2000 monetary
floor associated with the FECA misdemeanor..4 " This, in fact, indicates
an anomaly. In FECA Congress decided that violations involving
contributions totaling less than $2000 should not be subject to criminal
prosecution as misdemeanors. 4' However, if FECA has not
preempted section 1001, a conduit contribution for $500 could not be
prosecuted as a misdemeanor but could be prosecuted as a felony-
clearly an absurd result and a further argument for preemption.
A comparison of the FECA misdemeanor with conspiracy to
defraud the United States reaches the same results. ' °7 A conspiracy to
defraud the United States means simply a conspiracy "having as [its]
purpose impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any
department of government."' 8 Since the lawful functions of the FEC
include the government interests that justify disclosure
requirements,4 9 it is difficult to see how making a contribution
through a conduit would not impede those functions. Of course,
making the contribution itself is an overt act. Finally, there is almost
surely an agreement between the conduit and the true donor (or the
arranger of the conduit contribution) that the conduit will write the
check and that she will subsequently be reimbursed. The true donor
404. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam).
405. See 2 U.S.C. § 437(h)(1)(A) (1994) (stating that one commits a misdemeanor
offense only if the action involves "the making, receiving, or reporting of any contribution
or expenditure aggregating $2,000").
406. Id.
407. Compare 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1) (1994) ("Any person who knowingly and willfully
commits a violation of any provision of this Act which involves the making, receiving, or
reporting of any contribution or expenditure aggregating $2,000 or more during a calendar
year shall be fined, or imprisoned for not more than one year, or both."), with 18 U.S.C. §
371 (1994) ("If two or more persons conspire.., to defraud the United States, or any
agency thereof . . . each shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both.").
408. United States v. Levinson, 405 F.2d 971, 977 (6th Cir. 1968) (citing Haas v.
Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 958 (1969)); see also United
States v. Tuohey, 867 F.2d 534, 537 (9th Cir. 1989) (noting that § 371 criminalizes "any
willful impairment of a legitimate function of government, whether or not the improper
acts or objective are criminal under another statute").
409. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 68 (1976) (per curiam) (identifying preventing
corruption, helping voters identify the sources of contributions, and detecting violations of
contributions limits/prohibitions as state interests justifying disclosure requirements).
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must know of the reporting requirements and that misleading
information is being given to a government agency in order to satisfy
the "knowingly and willfully" requirement of the FECA
misdemeanor. ' ° Only if the conduit, unlike the true donor, were
unaware of the involvement of a government agency, as a result of a
plausible explanation of the conduit arrangement from the true donor,
would a violation of the FECA prohibition arguably not also violate
section 371.4"' While this could occur, it does not appear to be very
likely; conduits are usually aware that the true donor is trying to avoid
governmental scrutiny and/or make an illegal contribution.12
Thus, it appears that if a defendant has violated the FECA
prohibition against making a contribution in the name of another by
means of a conduit contribution, she will almost inevitably also be
guilty under sections 1001 (in connection with 2(b)) and 371. 4 11 It is
possible to hypothesize situations in which such would not be the case.
For example, the campaign treasurer might inadvertently fail to
submit the required reports or accidentally omit the conduit
contribution. The "true source" of the funds might reimburse the
conduit without the latter's knowledge. Such examples, however, are
not at all likely.
Under the lesser included offense doctrine, the determination of
whether the second offense is "included" may be made, depending on
the jurisdiction, using a "strict" standard (based solely on the statutory
definitions of the crimes), an "intermediate" standard (based on the
facts alleged in the indictment), or a "lenient factual" standard (based
410. United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 16 (D.D.C. 1998).
411. If the conduit was totally unaware of the true donor's intentions, there would be
no conspiracy to defraud the United States. See 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
412. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1994). But see Miller, supra note
18, at A15. In reporting on the Hsia case, Miller notes that the prosecutor said, "[M]any of
the straw donors were 'dupes' who had no idea what they were doing. One woman, for
example, testified that she thought the check she wrote to the 'DNC' might be going to a
security company that worked for the temple, not the Democratic National Committee."
Id. Miller further reports that the Hsia case involved "[Vice President Al] Gore's
controversial appearance at a Buddhist temple" which raised "over $65,000 in illegal
contributions" from, among others, Buddhist nuns and monks. Id. at Al, A15.
413. This is not necessarily the case for other types of violations of FECA, or other
general felony criminal statutes available to the prosecutors. "Prosecutors cannot charge
these felony offenses in every election law case, however, because they require the
government to prove additional elements beyond the core conduct that constitutes an
election law violation." Cole & Nabatoff, supra note 292, at 243 (footnote omitted)
(discussing, inter alia, misapplication of bank funds, money laundering, bank fraud, and
mail fraud). But for violations of the specific election law 2 U.S.C. § 441f, making
contributions in the name of another, the false statements and conspiracy statutes do not
appear to involve any additional elements.
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on the facts produced at trial).4 There are strong arguments in favor
of the lenient standard as best supporting the purpose of the lesser
included offense doctrine."5 Similarly, the standard for application of
the greater included offense doctrine should settle for a high degree of
congruence under which the vast majority of violations of the
benchmark offense will also be violations of the "included" offense.
That approach best serves the purpose of the doctrine-identifying
those situations where Congress probably intended that the
benchmark offense prohibit conduct that is already prohibited by the
"included" offense. Under this approach, it seems very clear that the
scope of the FECA prohibition against making contributions in the
name of another was intended to cover only conduct that would also
violate the general criminal statutes.416 Yet Congress made a violation
of the former a misdemeanor, while a violation of the latter is a
felony."7 This is a peculiar result, which one would expect Congress to
have mentioned if it intended both the FECA misdemeanor and
sections 1001 and 317 be available in this context, but there is no such
mention or explanation in FECA or its legislative history.1 8 These
circumstances suggest strongly that if Congress had specifically
considered conduit contributions when enacting FECA, it would have
intended that only the provisions of FECA and not the general
criminal statutes apply to such conduct.
D. A Framework for Preemption Analysis
A determination of whether an existing statute was implicitly
repealed pro tanto must go beyond the language of the statute or the
legislative history. 9 Rarely will Congress expressly indicate its
414. See Ettinger, supra note 378, at 195-209.
415. See id. at 225-28.
416. Along this line of reasoning, at least one court acknowledged that there is no
inconsistency between FECA and the general criminal provisions. See United States v.
Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 44 (D.D.C. 1998), rev'd in part, 176 F.3d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
417. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A) (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 1001 (1994).
418. See, e.g., United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 566 (3d Cir. 1994); see also Hsia, 24
F. Supp. 2d at 36; United States v. Trie, 23 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 1998); United States v.
Oakar, 924 F. Supp. 232 (D.D.C. 1996), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 111 F.3d 146 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1990).
419. See Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of Federal Law,
49 U. CHI. L. REv. 394, 438-39 (1982). Sunstein's thesis is that where enforcement schemes
are "manifestly inconsistent one another," per se rules of interpreting legislative intent are
unacceptable because they ignore statutory goals. Id. at 439. Instead, Sunstein calls for an
"unstructured judicial inquiry" to "determine what sorts of regulatory enforcement
schemes are likely to be inconsistent with [the statute]." Id. Only through such a "relatively
independent judicial assessment" can it be determined whether preemption has occurred.
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intent-indeed, it will rarely have thought about all the possibilities.42°
A limitation of the inquiry to statutory language and legislative
history thus amounts to little more than a per se rule, rather than a
presumption against repeals by implication.12' But neither a per se rule
against nor a per se rule in favor of repeals by implication in such
circumstances is optimal.422 Instead, the court should identify factors
that might contribute to a finding of "positive repugnancy." The
framework I propose is based on factors suggested in Galliano:
"context, structure, [and] specificity., 423 None of the factors are
necessarily dispositive, but combined, point toward a conclusion that
the general criminal statutes were repealed pro tanto by FECA.
1. Specificity
In Brown v. General Services Administration, the Supreme Court
noted that "a precisely drawn, detailed statute pre-empts more
general remedies. 4 24 The basis for such a general rule is that when
passing the narrowly drawn statute, "the mind of the legislator has
been turned to the details of a subject, and he has acted upon it,"
whereas the precise situations may well not have even been
considered when enacting the more general statute.425 Giving effect to
Id.
420. See id. at 418 (noting that in "almost all cases there will be virtually no evidence
of [congressional] intent"); see also United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1045 (1986) (noting that the impossibility of determining
whether Congress thought through the effects of a new law on existing laws requires strict
adherence to a rule requiring "clear and manifest" evidence of legislative intent).
421. Sunstein, supra note 419, at 436-38 (making similar argument in the context of
preemption analysis for § 1983).
422. Cf. id. at 437-38. Sunstein argues that a per se rule against presumption "could
frustrate the statutory plan by leading to disruption of regulatory enforcement
mechanisms; overenforcement of the law; inconsistency and confusion; resolution of
politically sensitive, technically complex issues by politically unaccountable, generalist
judges, and potential liability for engaging in conduct that Congress did not intend to make
unlawful." Id. at 437. A per se rule favoring preemption, on the other hand, "might
produce under-enforcement of unlawful activity, sanction conduct that Congress intended
to prevent, and cause an increase in the pressures on already overloaded federal
enforcement schemes." Id. at 438. Such a rule, he argues, is not a suitable solution unless
there were assurances that Congress did indeed intend for preemption. Id.
423. United States v. Galliano, 836 F.2d 1362, 1369 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
424. 425 U.S. 820, 834 (1976). The case addressed the question whether "the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in
federal employment." Id. at 821.
425. See Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976). The Court
concluded that "the narrowly drawn, specific venue provision of the National Bank Act
must prevail over the broader, more generally applicable venue provision of the Securities
Exchange Act." Id. at 158.
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the more general statute would, "by perverse operation of a type of
Gresham's law,, 426 drive the more narrowly drawn statute out of
operation. This reasoning could support a conclusion that FECA
preempts the general criminal statutes. FECA was addressed to the
specific, narrow issue of campaign funding. However, it is implausible,
absent any evidence from the legislative history, that the Congresses
that passed the false statements and conspiracy to defraud statutes
were considering campaign financing issues.
2. Structure
Similarly, Brown implied that a statute that comprehensively
addressed its subject in great detail is more likely to be considered as
having preempted more general statutes: "The balance, completeness,
and structural integrity of [the narrowly drawn statute] are
inconsistent with the petitioner's contention that the judicial remedy
afforded by [that statute] was designed merely to supplement other
putative judicial relief. 4 27 This is essentially the argument that Hansen
and Borden recognized but rejected as not applicable in these fact
situations and that Galliano accepted.428 In a comparison of FECA and
the general criminal statutes concerning conduit contributions,
however, the argument carries more weight than it did in Hansen and
Borden.429 FECA has a better claim to being a comprehensive scheme
than does EIGA or the AMAA. Thus, this factor also favors a finding
of repeal by implication.
3. Context
The most significant argument based on context is that described
in section C as the "greater included offense" theory, which seems to
426. Brown, 425 U.S. at 833. "Gresham's Law" was named after Sir Thomas Gresham
(1519-79), who was the master of the mint in England during Queen Elizabeth's reign in
the 16th Century. See http://xrefer.com/entry/344050.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2001);
http://xrefer.com/entry/445409.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2001). The law states that "bad
money drives out good," where between two coins of equal face value, the coin which is
worth less than face value will remain in circulation, whereas the "dearer" coin, whose
bullion value is worth more than its face value, will be extracted from circulation and
melted down because it is worth more as bullion than as legal tender. Id.
427. Brown, 425 U.S. at 832.
428. See supra notes 350-76 and accompanying text.
429. See United States v. Hansen, 772 F.2d 940, 944-49 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1045 (1986) (holding that the EIGA does not preempt the false statements
statute); United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 194-206 (1939) (holding that Congress
did not intend for the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act to strip the milk industry of
the protection afforded by the Sherman Act).
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also be implied in comments in Hopkins and the DOJ Manual. 3" If
statute A is a "greater included offense" of statute B, the most logical
interpretation is to treat statute B (here FECA) as having preempted
statute A (here the false statements and conspiracy to defraud the
United States statutes) pro tanto. As discussed above with respect to
conduit contributions, because the false statements and conspiracy to
defraud the United States statutes clearly qualify as "greater included
offenses" of the FECA prohibition against contributions in the name
of another, they provide further support for repeal by implication.
Taken together, these three factors present a powerful argument
that there is a "positive repugnancy" between FECA and the general
criminal statutes sufficient to justify a finding of repeal by implication.
The courts that have addressed the preemption argument have limited
their analyses, perhaps in response to limited arguments by
defendants, largely to statutory language and legislative history. When
they have ventured beyond these to review of precedents cited by the
government, they have failed to distinguish the precedents adequately
from the specific issue of FECA and conduit contributions. A more
thorough analysis, using the framework proposed above, supports a
different conclusion-that the general criminal statutes are not
available for prosecutions of conduit contributions.
V. THE FIRST AMENDMENT ARGUMENT
The final argument-that the First Amendment '31 prohibits
felony (and possibly misdemeanor) prosecutions of conduit
contributions absent additional elements that the government should
be required to prove-is the most ambitious argument I advance. It is
also the most straightforward. Defendants generally do not raise and
courts do not address this argument, apparently under the impression
that Buckley has settled the issue. '32 The Supreme Court, however, did
not address this precise issue, and the rationales advanced to justify
disclosure requirements apply with little force to conduit
contributions.
Buckley identified three government interests sufficient to justify
"infring[ing the] privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the
430. See supra notes 386-89 and accompanying text.
431. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
432. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that the First
Amendment did not invalidate FECA's disclosure requirements because disclosures
"directly serve substantial governmental interests").
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First Amendment": 433 preventing corruption, helping voters identify
the sources of contributions, and detecting violations of contribution
limits/prohibitions.434 The appropriate test for interfering with these
rights, however, is "if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important
interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary
abridgment .... Prosecutions for conduit contributions constitute a
far greater "deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights" '436 than the disclosure requirements themselves and, arguably,
should be justified by a stronger government interest or more
narrowly tailored means.437 The government interests recognized in
Buckley, however, look significantly different when discussing
prosecutions of conduit contributions, at least without qualifications
438to more narrowly tailor the intrusion.
The first Buckley justification, helping voters identify the sources
of contributions,439 is clearly the weakest of the three. The justification
logically should not distinguish between requirements aimed at the
campaign committees or requirements aimed at the donors
themselves. If enhanced voter information justifies disclosure
requirements imposed on the campaign committees,"0 it should also
justify disclosure requirements imposed on the donors themselves.
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that campaign committees
cannot require that donors disclose information about themselves in
order to include it on reports to the FEC."1 Thus, the chilling effect
created by prosecutions for conduit contributions must be justified, if
at all, by the other two Buckley rationales.
The corruption justification may be the strongest that Buckley
advanced. It is worth noting that the prevention of corruption was also
433. Id. at 64.
434. See id. at 68.
435. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
436. Id. at 65.
437. United States v. Hsia, 24 F. Supp. 2d 33, 55-56 (D.D.C. 1998).
438. Id. at 57.
439. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
440. Id. Disclosure
allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely
than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches.
The sources of a candidate's financial support also alert the voter to the interests
to which a candidate is most likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions
of future performance in office.
Id.
441. See Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 406 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) ("The law only requires political committees to ask donors for the information;
no federal law requires donors to report their name, address, occupation, and employer as
a condition of supporting the political party of their choice.") (emphasis added).
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a crucial factor advanced to support the contribution and expenditure
limits."2 In many respects, prevention of corruption might be
considered the primary purpose of FECA.43 Corruption prevention is
relevant to prohibitions against conduit contributions only with an
added qualification that the candidate or campaign committee knows
the true source of the funds. 4 The primary danger at which
contribution limits were aimed was the prospect of a quid pro quo for
the contribution or some other form of improper influence. 4'5 If the
candidate does not know that the contribution really comes from X, it
is difficult to see how X can extract a quid pro quo or exert improper
influence. This is the very insight that underlies the proposal by
Professors Ian Ayres and Jeremy Bulow of a system of mandated
anonymity, rather than mandated disclosure. 4"6
Clearly, it is possible to construct hypothetical situations where a
candidate knows the identity of the true donor behind a conduit
contribution, introducing the opportunity for quid pro quo corruption
or improper influence. For example, the donor might arrange the
contribution and tell the candidate privately that the check from A is
really from B. This, however, raises a significant issue of causation. If
the candidate knows the true source of the contribution but allows the
campaign treasurer to file a report identifying the conduit instead,
who causes the false statement? Since the candidate is responsible for
the accuracy of the FEC reports, the candidate seems clearly the more
culpable. 7
The third justification noted in Buckley was to facilitate the
identification of FECA violations, such as contributions from
prohibited sources or those exceeding the contribution limits.448
Accurate contribution reports, disclosing the true sources of funds, are
obviously of value in this respect. The prohibition against
contributions in the name of another, enforced by threats of
442. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 55.
443. Id. at 25-26.
444. See Ayres & Bulow, supra note 5, at 838.
445. Id.
446. See id. at 838-40.
447. See, e.g., Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 76 F.3d 400, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1996) (stating that FECA "requires the treasurer of a political committee to
report.., the name, address, occupation, and employer of donors giving more than $200 in
a single year[, but] [n]either the Act nor any other law... requires donors to disclose this
information").
448. Buckley actually expressed this as only "an essential means of gathering the data
necessary to detect violations of the contribution limitations described above." Buckley,
424 U.S. at 68 (emphasis added). It is reasonable, though, to include within this
justification the detection of contributions from prohibited sources as well.
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prosecution, serves the goal of accurate contribution reports."9 There
is still a question, however, as to whether this constitutes "means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms.""45 The prohibition as enforced today, whether prosecuted
under FECA or the general criminal statutes, is not limited to conduit
contribution schemes that are used to hide violations of other FECA
provisions.45' A contribution that is neither from a prohibited source
nor in excess of the prescribed limits, if made through a conduit, is still
subject to prosecution.452
As currently implemented, prosecutions for contributions in the
name of another seem excessively broad compared to the government
interests of preventing corruption and identifying violations of other
FECA provisions. The enforcement scheme thus seems to create
excessive infringement on protected First Amendment rights.
Prosecution under the FECA misdemeanor provision and the general
criminal statutes is arguably unconstitutional as those statutes are
currently interpreted.
This does not necessarily mean that the government should be
absolutely prohibited from such prosecutions. Another more
narrowly-tailored alternative might be to require the government in
such prosecutions to prove that the contribution violated another
FECA provision, whether because it is from a prohibited source or
because it is in excess of the contribution limits. 44 This would
transform the prohibition against contributions in the name of another
into a punishment "enhancer" rather than an independent culpable
act intrinsically worthy of punishment. Such a change would protect
449. Id. at 83-84.
450. Id. at 25.
451. See supra notes 430-32 and accompanying text. A prosecution under the general
criminal statutes need not prove any violation of FECA, and a FECA misdemeanor
prosecution for making a contribution in the name of another need not prove an attempt
to circumvent other provisions, for example, contribution limits or prohibitions on
contributions from certain sources.
452. Both Trie and Kanchanalak involved indictments for soft money donations, which
are not subject to most FECA prohibitions. See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text.
453. For a discussion of how courts are concerned with First Amendment rights, see,
e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14-35; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 385 (2000).
See also Ayres & Bulow, supra note 5, at 867, 883-86 (discussing the difficulty of designing
campaign restrictions that are constitutional and proposing a mandated anonymity
program).
454. An alternative would be to permit prosecution when the candidate (or
appropriate official in the campaign committee) was aware of the true source of the funds,
since that would involve potential quid pro quo corruption. However, as noted previously,
this raises a serious causation issue.
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this "area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities." '455
VI. CONCLUSION
The number of these prosecutions in recent years require
rethinking and resolution of the issues raised above. If the First
Amendment does not absolutely bar such prosecutions, the
government should at least be required to prove that the conduct in
question violated other FECA prohibitions in order to avoid excessive
intrusion into this protected area of political speech. Prosecutions also
should be limited to the FECA misdemeanor provisions, recognizing
that Congress has developed a comprehensive regulatory scheme that
conflicts with the general criminal statutes. Finally, if felony
prosecutions under the general criminal statutes continue, the
Supreme Court should resolve the disagreement between Curran and
GabriellHsia in favor of requiring proof that defendants know about
FECA reporting requirements and deliberately act to circumvent
them.
Proponents of campaign finance reform are likely to react
negatively to these suggestions. Anything that weakens enforcement
of FECA, which proponents of reform already consider inadequate,
would only appear to exacerbate the problem. However, this concern
is misplaced. The suggested changes should have very little effect on
enforcement and to the extent that the changes do, the consequences
would not be as serious as reform advocates may anticipate.
Enforcement is unlikely to be hampered substantially. Proof of
conduct that violates other FECA provisions actually will often be
readily available. Many of the recent. prosecutions of conduit
contributions have involved either corporate or foreign funds.456
Similarly, proof of knowledge of reporting requirements could be
readily developed. The FEC or DOJ could readily "publicize the law
to the target audience to eliminate the possibility that defendants can
claim ignorance of it," and "[s]igns, brochures, and individualized
warnings 4 57 by campaign committees and fundraisers could be
required. Further, the reduction of penalties from a felony to a
misdemeanor may have relatively little effect on deterrence. Similarly-
situated individuals who are worried about a possible sentence of
455. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.
456. See, e.g., United States v. Trie, 21 F. Supp. 2d 7, 13 (D.D.C. 1998) (foreign
sources); United States v. Kanchanalak, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1999) (corporate
funds); United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1994) (contribution limits).
457. Wiley, supra note 120, at 1093.
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twenty-five years in prison.. may be substantially deterred even by the
prospect of imprisonment of five years. Long potential sentences
might logically be justified as leverage to extract cooperation from
defendants, in an attempt to gather evidence against more campaign
officials, whose conduct would be more culpable if they were knowing
participants in the scheme. As noted above, however, in such cases,
campaign officials are often victims of the scheme, rather than mere
participants.
In many cases, the changes I propose would not prevent
prosecution and conviction of the same individuals who have been
successfully prosecuted for conduit contributions. These proposed
changes would ensure that juries, not prosecutors, make the
determination that the conduct in question is sufficiently culpable to
warrant substantial punishment. Relying on "the unreviewable
discretion of one individual [is] . ..wholly incompatible with our
system of justice, 459 and these proposed changes would reduce that
problem.
Even if prosecutions of this type of conduct decline, that is not as
large a price to pay as it may seem. The typical defendant in these
cases poses far from the greatest threat that our electoral system faces.
As pointed out by a former FEC associate general counsel:
What we have now is a paradox of campaign finance law
enforcement. Infrequent contributors outside the Washington
system are the targets of enforcement action by the FEC and the
DOJ, while regular and influential participants such as issue
advocacy groups spend money through legal channels but have a
greater impact on the political process ....
Thus, the process is not abused most severely by those who
violate the law, but by those who navigate through the law.46°
Any minor reduction in the aggressive enforcement of campaign
financing law will have little adverse effect if enforcement currently
provides little benefit because aimed at the wrong targets.
Campaign financing abuses are very real and can pose very
serious threats to our system. The conduct alleged in conduit
contribution cases should not be dismissed lightly. 461 The DOJ's
458. See Miller, supra note 18 (reporting on the conviction of Maria Hsia).
459. Berra v. United States, 351 U.S. 131, 138 (1956) (Black, J., dissenting).
460. Gross & Hong, supra note 93, at 55-56.
461. These cases often involve attempts by the defendants to use conduit contributions
to circumvent other limitations or prohibitions. See, e.g., United States v. Kanchanalak, 192
F.3d 1037, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (contributions from foreign nationals and corporations);
Curran, 20 F.3d at 563 (contributions in excess of limits and/or from corporate source);
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current aggressive approach to these cases, however, goes far beyond
effective law enforcement and is incompatible with Congress' design
in FECA, as well as fundamental notions of justice. It is time for the
courts to put an end to this approach.
United States v. Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 211 (5th Cir. 1990) (illegal corporate
contributions). These other limitations and prohibitions are important, and conduit
contributions to avoid detection should be deterred. The point of this Article is not that
"innocent" people are being prosecuted, but that they could be under current
interpretations of the law and the DOJ's current prosecutive approach.
